Behind the Reaction and Counter-Reaction in the Middle East
The US announcement of an imminent Iranian attack on Israel has sparked fears of a long-awaited escalation to open warfare in the Middle East. However, that attack was similar in size and intensity to the one in April 2024, came at a time of day when casualties were minimized, and was calibrated not to pose very great challenges to Israel’s layered missile defense system, assisted by American and, it seems, British forces.
After the assassination of the leader of Hezbollah and the explosive pager episode straight out of a John Le Carre novel, Iran probably had to react in order to limit the demoralization of their partners and the growth of the Israeli intelligence services’ “aura”, which was at paranoid levels in the region anyway. The lack of reaction signals weakness in the Middle East region, which is all the more dangerous when the weakness is real, as the Iranians are probably alarmed by the resources the Israelis can mobilize in Syria, Lebanon and even Iran. Escalation to war is risky under these circumstances, especially since Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated an uncanny Western unity, willing to accept its own losses to punish others, and Iran’s partners are transactional and calculating about their own relationship with the West, especially China (Iran itself taking advantage of Russia’s need in order to establish trade, technological and military relations on far more favorable terms than it would have obtained before).
I would argue that this attack had another role. Iran has announced that in the ballistic missile mix are hypersonic missiles. These have been the superstar weapons system of recent years, with all the major powers announcing that they are working on these missiles that are too fast to be detected and intercepted with the same performance as normal missiles, posing a danger to aircraft carriers and other important military assets. If one considers what is not reported in the press, such as details of the cyber and electronic attacks that probably accompanied the 180 Iranian missiles, then one can think that this attack was intended to let Israel and its partners know of Iran’s new military capabilities and to establish a possible deterrent. We already know that the military relationship between Iran and Russia is not just unidirectional, with the delivery of Shaheed drones for the war in Ukraine. Iran not only buys Russian military equipment, but also technology and other services that are then integrated into the national military capabilities through the efficient and diverse national defense industry stimulated by the sanctions Iran is under. These then feed into Iran’s means of attack and defense.
We have concrete examples from the US Center for Strategic and International Studies’ latest report on space threats. The 2024 report points out that Russia is providing the Iranians with launch services, satellite production services, and technology transfers to advance the field locally. The beneficiary is not only the Iranian civilian space program or the Armed Forces, but also the aerospace forces of the Revolutionary Guard, which has its own space program, with several types of rockets launching satellites (Qased, Qaem 100, Simorgh, Sarir in design phase), several satellites already in orbit, some of its own production, for military earth observation (Noor-2 and Noor-3, Tolou-3 produced by a military system company but advertised as civilian, Pars-1 launched by Russia and Pars-2 and 3 in production, Khayyam built by Russia, Khayyam-2 in production, Soraya for military research) and a network of ten telecommunications satellites under construction named after Gen. Qasem Soleimani. The report also points to Iranian capabilities in jamming and spoofing GPS positioning signals, which have been tested on airplanes and ships passing through Iran’s neighborhood (and responsible for the loss of a US drone in 2011) and whose usefulness has been proven in Ukraine both before and during the war (spoofing attacks on British and Dutch ships in the Black Sea that caused the systems to indicate the ships’ position in the port of Sevastopol instead of Odessa being a known case).
In this sense, we can also look at the Iranian attack as an opportunity to demonstrate these capabilities, which will emerge from Israeli and Western analysis of the attack. Because all attempts at coercion seek to induce a certain behavior in the target, Iran hopes that the demonstration of these new capabilities will deter further Israeli actions (or cause the West to deter Israeli actions) against Iran or its partners, including counterattacks on its own territory against critical infrastructure, especially in the energy sector. Reversing the demoralization of Iranian partners in the region, who face significant technological asymmetries in their conflict with Israel, is another desired outcome.
We can say with certainty that this attack was not the first salvo in the conventional war to settle the issue of Tehran’s non-recognition of Israel’s existence. When/if such an attack comes, it will contain thousands of missiles and drones and will be accompanied by ground attacks from surrounding countries, aimed at overwhelming Israeli defenses and occupying territory before there is time to organize Western military assistance. Until then, attacks on naval commerce in the Red Sea and by proxy forces are far more profitable than all-out war.
Photo source: PxHere
