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In Vienna, the room is familiar: delegates, translators, carefully calibrated phrases. But the subject is anything but routine. As news of strikes and counter‑strikes ripples across screens, the nuclear file – the one issue that can turn a regional war into a global panic – returns to the centre of the agenda. The head of the world’s nuclear watchdog warns that military action around nuclear facilities is uniquely dangerous. Outside the conference hall, markets price war risk, shipping companies reroute, and Gulf capitals measure how quickly a confrontation they did not choose could move onto their territory.

This is the defining feature of the present moment: diplomacy hasn’t vanished; it has been compressed. It is no longer slow negotiation with occasional pressure. It is bargaining conducted in the shadow of immediate force – what classic theorists described as coercion’s “power to hurt” functioning as communication (Schelling, 1966). The Middle East is living through a period of central coercive diplomacy, where coercion is not a tool among others, but the dominant grammar of state interaction.

This brief speaks to three questions that many observers are asking in different languages: Is this the end of diplomacy? Has the world returned to “might is right”? And what role remains for middle powers – especially those in the Gulf?

What this analysis argues

The short answer is that diplomacy is not dead; it is being militarized. But the more urgent argument is sharper: the current U.S./Israel strike‑forward approach is strategically counterproductive, especially on the core driver of escalation – the nuclear file. Even if strikes degrade capabilities temporarily, they can deepen Iran’s incentives to harden and disperse its program, weaken international verification at exactly the moment it is most needed, widen spillovers onto Gulf infrastructure and global trade, and erode the coalition legitimacy required for durable restraint (Byman & Waxman, 2002; Reiter, 2005).

The alternative is not wishful “dialogue.” It is architecture: a negotiated framework that makes coercion governable, embeds leverage in verification, and provides credible off‑ramps. The actor best positioned to build this is not a single superpower. It is a middle‑power coalition – explicitly, an MPC‑GS (Middle‑Power Coalition for Gulf Stability) – anchored by Gulf conveners with direct exposure and mediation capacity, and reinforced by external middle powers with major energy, trade, and diplomatic stakes.

The endgame should not be a nostalgic return to past formats. It should be a new Gulf Security Compact, with the nuclear file as Pillar 1, and with concrete regional risk‑reduction pillars that address missiles, drones, maritime stability, proxies, and infrastructure resilience.

1. Not the end of diplomacy – its most dangerous form

When people say diplomacy is over, what they usually mean is that negotiated settlements are not visible. But invisibility is not absence. In coercive crises, diplomacy changes shape. Instead of public treaties, it becomes private threshold‑setting, deconfliction, and bargaining over what violence will stop and what concessions will follow.

In that sense, the “end of diplomacy” thesis misreads the moment. The present confrontation is better described as diplomacy under duress, where diplomacy’s traditional outputs are delayed because the parties have not yet established the minimal conditions for bargaining: clarity of demands, credible threats, and credible assurances (George, 1991).

Recent reporting underscores how thin the margin is between nuclear risk management and blind escalation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has assessed strike impacts at Natanz and reported damage to entrance buildings, while noting no expected radiological consequences and no additional impact detected on the underground facility itself (Reuters, 2026a). In parallel, Iran’s representatives have alleged wider targeting, and the IAEA has repeatedly emphasized the dangers of military operations around nuclear sites (Associated Press, 2026). The details will evolve; what matters for policy is that monitoring and communication are under strain at precisely the moment they should be strengthened.

If diplomacy is to reassert itself, it will not do so by replacing coercion. It will do so by structuring coercion – turning force into bargaining leverage rather than a substitute for strategy.

2. “Might is right?” Force can decide facts; legitimacy decides what lasts

The return of overt military action invites the oldest conclusion in international politics: “might makes right”. But that slogan collapses a crucial distinction between tactical outcomes and durable settlements.

Yes, force can create immediate facts: a degraded facility, a disrupted supply chain, a shaken leadership circle. Yet history and theory agree on a harder point: coercion succeeds when the target believes compliance will end pressure and improve security. Coercion fails when compliance looks like the opening bid in an endless sequence of demands (Schelling, 1966; Byman & Waxman, 2002).

This is where legitimacy and law become practical – not moral – constraints. The UN Charter’s prohibition on the threat or use of force and its self-defence framework remains the language states use to justify actions and to recruit or resist coalitions (UN, 1945). Even when enforcement is weak, legal narratives matter because third parties – states, firms, insurers, financiers – make decisions under reputational and regulatory constraints.

In the Gulf, the relevance is immediate. The Strait of Hormuz is not a metaphor; it is infrastructure. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that in 2024 oil flows through Hormuz averaged about 20 million barrels per day – roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption – and that around one‑fifth of global LNG trade also transited the strait, primarily from Qatar (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025). When coercion spills into shipping risk, the costs propagate far beyond the battlefield.

So “might is right” captures the visibility of force, but not the political economy of outcomes. The durable question is whether force is being used in a way that can be translated into a verifiable bargain – or whether it is creating a self‑sustaining escalation cycle.

3. Why a strike‑forward strategy is strategically counterproductive

This article’s core judgment is not that coercion is illegitimate in principle. It is that coercion without a credible endgame is self‑defeating on the nuclear file.

3.1 It encourages hardening, dispersal, opacity, and an “insurance” logic

Preventive strikes can impose delays. But they also predictably push nuclear programs toward adaptation: deeper facilities, more redundancy, more concealment, and stronger incentives to maintain a rapid breakout option. The political mechanism is not mysterious. When a state believes it is being attacked to prevent capability, it may infer that only a more survivable deterrent – or an opaquer hedging posture – will end the threat.

The historical debate around the 1981 Osiraq strike illustrates why “successful” prevention narratives are often overstated. Dan Reiter’s reassessment argues that Osiraq was not well suited for weapon plutonium production and that the attack may have increased Saddam Hussein’s commitment to acquiring weapons – casting doubt on the inference that preventive strikes reliably solve proliferation risks (Reiter, 2005).

3.2 It weakens verification when verification is most valuable

Nuclear crises are uniquely sensitive to monitoring continuity. If inspectors cannot validate what has been damaged, rebuilt, moved, or hidden, then adversaries assume the worst. That pressure pushes decision‑makers toward escalation and away from bargaining.

In the current crisis, the IAEA’s assessments – filtered through member‑state reporting, satellite imagery, and limited channels – highlight a central dilemma: without sustained verification pathways, neither restraint nor escalation can be measured, and both sides can claim success without clarity (Reuters, 2026a; AP, 2026).

3.3 It widens the conflict onto Gulf territory and global markets

Once the nuclear file becomes kinetic, retaliation and signalling rarely remain confined to nuclear sites. The escalation spreads through the systems that are easiest to hit and hardest to defend: maritime traffic, energy infrastructure, cyber networks, and proxies.

For Gulf states, this is existentially practical. Their economic transformation programs require predictable risk premia, reliable aviation and tourism flows, and investor confidence that megaproject timelines will not be repeatedly disrupted. A region defined by recurring coercive shocks becomes less investable – an outcome that undercuts the Gulf’s own strategic diversification as well as global economic stability.

3.4 It erodes coalition legitimacy and narrows diplomatic options

Even states that share the objective of non-proliferation often diverge over means, legal framing, and acceptable risk. When objectives are ambiguous or appear maximalist, coalition partners hedge. They become less willing to provide intelligence cooperation, basing access, sanctions enforcement, or diplomatic cover.

The result is paradoxical: a strategy intended to demonstrate resolve can reduce the political capacity to sustain a long campaign – precisely because long campaigns require partners.

3.5 It normalizes a preventive‑force equilibrium

The longer preventive strikes are treated as a default tool, the more every actor plans for them. Programs become more dispersed, early‑warning incentives intensify, “use‑or‑lose” fears grow, and crisis thresholds fall. Over time, diplomacy becomes not an alternative to violence, but a pause between rounds.

The strategic destination is not a stable non-proliferation equilibrium. It is an unstable security environment where each crisis teaches the next one to be faster and more destructive.

4. Middle powers are not spectators; they are missing architecture builders

If a strike‑forward strategy is counterproductive, who can build the alternative? Not by replacing the agency of the U.S., Israel, or Iran, but by creating the structure that makes restraint rational.

Middle powers are best defined by behaviour: they are states with meaningful capacity that tend to invest in multilateral solutions, coalition‑building, and institutional entrepreneurship, especially when great‑power diplomacy is polarized (Cooper, 2016). In the Gulf crisis, they matter because they can supply three scarce strategic goods.

First, credible off‑ramps. Direct adversaries often cannot offer face‑saving exits because domestic politics turns compromise into humiliation. Middle powers can host indirect talks, propose sequencing, and frame reciprocal steps as regional stabilization rather than capitulation (George, 1991).

Second, verification innovation. In nuclear crises, trust is rarely available. Verification must substitute for it. Here, the Latin American experience offers a practical template. The Brazilian‑Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) is a binational safeguards institution created in 1991 that verifies the peaceful use of nuclear materials through a common accounting and control system, in coordination with IAEA safeguards (NTI, n.d.). ABACC is not directly transplantable to the Gulf, but its logic – regionalized verification capacity that complements global institutions – should inform Gulf design.

Third, a forum that survives great‑power gridlock. When the UN Security Council is divided, an MPC‑GS coalition can still coordinate maritime norms, incident reporting, inducements, and risk‑reduction measures that reduce the likelihood of uncontrolled escalation.

This is why the “middle power” question is not academic. It is the concrete difference between a region trapped in serial crises and a region building the rules that contain them.

5. The MPC‑GS coalition: who should be in the room, and why

The MPC‑GS should be explicit and balanced: Gulf‑anchored, globally reinforced, technically competent.

At its core should be Gulf states that combine exposure, leverage, and convening capacity: Oman and Qatar as practiced mediators; the UAE and Saudi Arabia as security and economic heavyweights whose choices shape regional expectations.

The coalition should then add external middle powers whose interests are direct and whose diplomatic weight is usable: the EU/E3 (as sanctioning and diplomatic actors), India, Japan, and South Korea (as major energy importers and shipping stakeholders). The EIA’s estimate that most Hormuz oil and LNG flows head to Asian markets underscores why Asian middle powers have both incentives and leverage to support stabilization (EIA, 2025).

Two additional representatives matter for legitimacy and design creativity:

Egypt should be the African representative. It sits at the hinge of Mediterranean and Red Sea security, has long been a leading proponent of a Middle East nuclear‑weapon‑free and WMD‑free zone agenda, and carries institutional weight through the Arab League and its standing role in regional diplomacy (UNODA, 2025).

A Latin American representative should be included for both legitimacy and technical precedent. Brazil is the most plausible choice: it is a major diplomacy‑practicing middle power with direct experience in regional nuclear verification through ABACC and a record of multilateral engagement on non-proliferation norms (NTI, n.d.).

The point is not to “import” external agendas. It is to widen the coalition beyond the immediate battlefield and to signal that Gulf stability is a global public good – one that demands institutional solutions, not only military ones.

6. The endgame: a Gulf Security Compact, with the nuclear file as Pillar 1

The goal should be a new Gulf Security Compact – not merely a ceasefire or a revival of old formats. The compact should recognize a hard truth: without a verifiable nuclear restraint framework, every regional shock becomes existential.

Pillar 1: Nuclear restraint and verification

The compact must begin with nuclear restraints that are measurable and sequenced limits on enrichment, stockpiles, and advanced centrifuge deployment tied to restored monitoring continuity. The details must be negotiated; the principle is simple: verification is the currency that makes restraint credible.

A practical innovation would be a Gulf verification support mechanism inspired by ABACC’s regionalized safeguards logic – designed not to replace the IAEA, but to reinforce monitoring continuity through jointly agreed accounting practices, technical exchanges, and crisis communication procedures (NTI, n.d.).

Pillar 2: Missile, drone, and air defence risk reduction

The compact should establish incident‑prevention rules for missiles and unmanned systems: notification windows for certain tests, exclusion zones around critical civilian infrastructure, and deconfliction procedures to reduce accidental escalation.

Pillar 3: Maritime stability and chokepoint protection

Given Hormuz’s systemic importance, the compact should codify rules of behaviour at sea – boardings, proximity operations, unmanned system use – plus shared incident reporting. A key objective is to reduce the incentive for brinkmanship that markets punish immediately.

Pillar 4: Non‑interference and proxy restraint

Proxy warfare thrives when states can deny agency. The compact should establish a reciprocal non‑interference baseline with a dispute‑registration mechanism – an institutional place to put grievances before they become attacks.

Pillar 5: Critical infrastructure and cyber resilience

Energy installations, ports, desalination facilities, and aviation systems are not just national assets; they are regional lifelines. The compact should include resilience standards and rapid repair cooperation, especially for cyber vulnerabilities.

Pillar 6: A standing diplomatic process

Architecture is not a single agreement; it is a process that outlasts crises. The compact should create a small secretariat and standing working groups, producing neutral incident summaries and convening technical channels even when political talks stall.

This is maximal in scope but realistic in sequencing: you do not build a house during a storm, but you can pour a foundation that prevents the next storm from levelling the structure.

7. How to get there: sequencing without bullet‑pointing the world

Coercive diplomacy works when it offers an exit. The MPC‑GS strategy should therefore be staged.

In the first ninety days, the task is stabilization: protecting monitoring channels, reducing maritime incidents, and securing a temporary restraint understanding around civilian infrastructure. This is not “peace.” It is lowering the temperature so that bargaining can begin.

From three months to two years, the task is institutionalization: turning crisis measures into compact pillars, formalizing verification support, and embedding maritime and drone/missile rules into routine operating procedures.

The essential point is to treat architecture as strategy, not as an optional add‑on to military campaigns.

8. What Western policy should do differently – without pretending power is optional

A Western policy audience often frames choices as “force versus diplomacy.” The MPC‑GS approach reframes the choice as “force without an endgame versus coercion embedded in architecture.”

For the United States, the most important shift is to align coercive signals with credible assurances. Clarity matters: what counts as compliance, and what does compliance buy? Without assurances, coercion invites defiance; with assurances and verification, coercion can become bargaining power (George, 1991; Byman & Waxman, 2002).

For Israel, the strategic shift is from preventive degradation toward containment that is politically and institutionally sustainable. Military operations may still occur, but they should be treated as subordinate to a negotiated verification endgame, not as a replacement for it.

For Gulf states, the key move is collective leadership. Fragmentation invites forum‑shopping and escalation. A Gulf‑anchored MPC‑GS that offers inducements and process discipline can turn Gulf vulnerability into Gulf leverage.

And for Iran, the route to reduced pressure runs through verifiable restraint and stabilized maritime behaviour. Without verification, assurances will not be believed; without maritime restraint, Gulf opposition will harden.

Conclusion

This is not the end of diplomacy. It is diplomacy in its most volatile form, conducted through central coercive bargaining. In that environment, “might is right” can feel true – because force is loud. But durable outcomes still depend on legitimacy, coalition cohesion, and verification.

A strike‑forward strategy that lacks a credible negotiated endgame is strategically counterproductive on the nuclear file: it hardens incentives to hedge, weakens monitoring, widens spillovers, and normalizes preventive force dynamics.

The feasible alternative is not to wish coercion away, but to govern it. The MPC‑GS coalition – explicitly Gulf‑anchored and globally reinforced, including Egypt as an African representative and Brazil as a Latin American representative – can build a Gulf Security Compact that begins with nuclear verification and extends to the regional systems through which escalation spreads.

If the Gulf is to escape an era where each crisis is rehearsal for the next, it will not be by choosing between force and diplomacy. It will be by rebuilding the architecture that makes restraint rational – and war less likely.

Photo source: Tuğba / pexels.com.

References

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Reiter, D. (2005). Preventive attacks against nuclear programs and the “success” at Osiraq. The Nonproliferation Review, 12(2), 355–371. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700500379008.

Reuters. (2026, March 3). IAEA confirms entrances to Iran’s Natanz enrichment plant were bombed. Reuters.

Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and influence. Yale University Press.

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U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2025, June 16). Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint. Today in Energy.