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Governance and Political Stability: Reform, Transparency, and the Populist Challenge

Governance and Political Stability: Reform, Transparency, and the Populist Challenge Policy Brief, 2026 Series: “Romania at a Crossroads” – Episode 4

Governance remains the foundation of Romania’s long-term stability, shaping state capacity, public trust, and the credibility of reforms tied to EU and OECD integration. Over the past decade, Romania has made notable progress in judicial consolidation and administrative digitalisation, yet persistent vulnerabilities continue to weaken institutional performance. Fragmented public administration, frequent ministerial turnover, politicised appointments, and inconsistent policy continuity undermine reform momentum. Rising populist sentiment, low trust in political institutions, and intensifying electoral volatility add extra layers of uncertainty. Drawing on European Commission Rule of Law Reports, Eurobarometer trends, OECD accession benchmarks, and Transparency International indicators, this article examines Romania’s governance trajectory, identifies sources of institutional drift, and outlines strategic pathways for strengthening democratic resilience.

[N.B.: This article was drafted prior to the onset of the April 2026 episode of political instability affecting the Government of Romania, precipitated by the withdrawal of political support by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) for Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan (PNL) within the governing coalition, thereby resulting in the loss of the parliamentary majority and placing the executive authority in a state of political crisis.]

 

Introduction: Why governance determines stability

Romania’s political and economic trajectory remains deeply shaped by the robustness of its governance system. Since 2015, the country has oscillated between periods of institutional advances and phases of stagnation. Governance quality directly influences the state’s ability to absorb EU funds, carry out structural reforms, maintain public trust, and ensure a predictable policy environment. In everyday practice, governance is not merely a theoretical concept – it forms the backbone of state capacity, influencing regulatory fairness, public service delivery, and resilience in the face of crises.

Eurobarometer data from 2015 to 2025 consistently show that trust in the national government rarely exceeds one-quarter of the population, placing Romania below the EU-27 average and most regional peers. This persistent gap fuels public scepticism, amplifies the appeal of populist movements, and complicates efforts to build consensus around long-term reforms. As Romania deepens its engagement with the OECD and confronts complex geopolitical and economic challenges, governance quality becomes the decisive variable shaping future stability.

 

The post-CVM transition: Rule of law under pressure?

The formal closure of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in 2023 marked an important moment for Romania. It reflected the European Commission’s recognition of sustained progress in judicial reforms and anti-corruption efforts. Yet the end of CVM also shifted responsibility: without the structure of external monitoring, safeguarding the rule of law increasingly depends on domestic political commitment and institutional resilience.

European Commission Rule of Law Reports between 2020 and 2024 highlight both achievements and remaining tensions. Judicial independence has strengthened due to more transparent appointment processes and clearer institutional frameworks. However, the independence of prosecutors continues to face vulnerabilities, especially during periods of political competition or coalition instability. DNA and DIICOT maintain their operational relevance, but resource constraints, leadership fluctuations, and procedural complexities can hinder the resolution of high-profile corruption cases.

Regionally, Romania performs better than Bulgaria and Hungary in several rule-of-law dimensions, yet it remains below the EU-27 average. Sustaining progress requires insulating judicial institutions from undue political influence and ensuring predictable resourcing. Without CVM, maintaining standards relies more heavily on national actors, civil society oversight, and the judiciary’s capacity for self-regulation.

 

State capacity and public administration reform

Public administration reform remains one of Romania’s most persistent structural challenges. OECD governance assessments from 2023-2024 underline systemic issues related to policy coherence, capacity deficits, and administrative fragmentation. These weaknesses directly affect the state’s ability to implement long-term commitments, including the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) and broader EU funding programmes.

Between 2016 and 2024, Romania experienced exceptionally high turnover in key ministries: Finance, Education, and Health underwent repeated leadership changes. This instability has undermined institutional memory and disrupted continuity in policy execution. Overlapping ministerial mandates and weak coordination mechanisms often lead to contradictory decisions or delays in enacting strategic reforms.

Digitalisation efforts have advanced, particularly within ANAF and public procurement systems, but regional disparities remain substantial. Urban administrations adopt digital tools and EU project management practices more effectively than rural municipalities, creating uneven service quality. These disparities reinforce territorial inequalities and weaken the state’s overall governance coherence.

 

Populism, volatility, and public trust

Populism has become a defining force in Romanian politics, reshaping party dynamics and influencing the broader political discourse. The persistent erosion of trust in political institutions has provided fertile ground for anti‑establishment movements. According to Eurobarometer 103 (2025), trust in parliament remains at just 12%, and trust in political parties is even lower at 9%.

AUR’s rapid ascent since 2019 reflects not only frustration with corruption, inequality, and governance failures, but also the party’s sophisticated deployment of right-wing populist narratives. Its rhetoric combines strong national‑sovereigntist language, anti‑elitist framing, and anti‑globalist critique with promises of expanding social protection for “ordinary Romanians.” This blend mirrors wider European trends identified in the populism literature (Mudde, 2007; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015), where right‑wing populist parties adopt welfare‑chauvinistic social policies – support for families, traditional values, and nationally‑restricted welfare benefits – as tools to broaden their appeal. In Romania’s case, AUR’s promises to increase family allowances, defend conservative social norms, and resist EU‑driven reforms situate it ideologically closer to Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) and segments of Hungary’s Fidesz, both of which pair cultural conservatism with selective welfare expansion.

The trajectory illustrated in the Populist Sentiment Index highlights several important consequences for Romania’s political stability and governance landscape. First, Romania’s upward trend mirrors broader regional patterns in Central and Eastern Europe, where distrust in representative institutions has fuelled parties advancing nationalist, anti-elite, and welfare-chauvinistic narratives. Second, as populist sentiment intensifies, mainstream political parties face pressure to harden their rhetoric, adjust policy priorities, or adopt more protectionist positions – changes that can distort long-term policymaking. Third, heightened populist mobilisation increases electoral volatility, making coalition formation more complex and raising the likelihood of abrupt policy swings. Finally, sustained levels of populist sentiment risk eroding institutional legitimacy, weakening administrative continuity, and narrowing the consensus required for structural reforms. In Romania’s case, this convergence of societal frustration and assertive populist messaging places additional strain on governance coherence and reform stability.

USR’s fluctuating trajectory highlights the instability of Romania’s reformist and anti‑establishment space, where anti-corruption messaging competes with ideological fragmentation. PSD, meanwhile, has maintained stable support by selectively incorporating soft‑populist cues – emphasising social protection, economic sovereignty, and political stability – while distancing itself from overt anti-EU rhetoric. This adaptive approach resembles strategies seen in other centre-left parties in Central Europe facing rising populist competition (Pirro, 2022).

Electoral volatility reached unprecedented levels in the 2024 cycle, complicating coalition formation and policymaking. Such volatility heightens the risk of abrupt policy reversals, undermining Romania’s international credibility and weakening the continuity required for complex reforms. The combined effects of institutional distrust, populist narratives, and social‑welfare appeals narrow the space for long-term, consensus-oriented governance.

 

Governance risks: fragmentation, patronage, and institutional drift

Despite measurable progress, Romania continues to face entrenched governance vulnerabilities that limit its institutional effectiveness. Fragmentation across ministries often results in disjointed policies and poor coordination. Strategic sectors – such as energy, transport, and regional development – frequently operate in silos, driven by short-term political cycles rather than integrated planning.

Patronage networks remain deeply embedded in local and regional politics. Transparency International’s assessments highlight persistent vulnerabilities in public procurement, including non-competitive procedures, conflicts of interest, and political influence. These weaknesses slow infrastructure development and reinforce public scepticism toward government institutions.

The success of EU funds absorption – especially the PNRR – depends heavily on administrative capacity, stability, and coordination. However, delays in project preparation, limited local expertise, and administrative fragmentation pose risks to timely implementation. OECD accession introduces even stricter expectations, requiring Romania to adopt robust standards in regulatory impact assessment, public integrity, and SOE governance.

 

Transparency and anti-corruption: gains, reversals, and constraints

DNA and DIICOT remain critical guardians of Romania’s anti-corruption architecture. Their credibility and performance are essential for sustaining democratic resilience. Although these institutions have retained operational capacity despite political pressures, their ability to process complex cases depends heavily on stable leadership, adequate funding, and efficient procedures.

Procurement remains one of the most vulnerable areas in the governance system. Emergency procedures and deviations from standard competitive practices are still frequent. SOEs operating in sectors such as transport and energy continue to face governance challenges, often stemming from politicised appointments. While Romania has transposed the EU Whistleblower Directive, uneven implementation limits its impact. ANI’s oversight is constrained by resource shortages and procedural bottlenecks.

 

European integration, OECD accession, and governance conditionality

Romania’s EU membership continues to shape its governance landscape through a series of conditional mechanisms: annual Rule of Law Reports, European Semester recommendations, and PNRR milestones. These instruments collectively act as a post-CVM accountability framework, guiding reforms in justice, public administration, and procurement.

OECD accession, however, represents a more demanding and transformative benchmark. Meeting OECD standards necessitates a shift toward evidence-based policymaking, improved regulatory quality, greater transparency in SOE oversight, and stronger codes of conduct within the public sector. Successful accession would not only reinforce institutional credibility but also anchor Romania more firmly within a governance model aligned with advanced democracies.

Failing to meet these standards risks a drift toward a hybrid governance model – one in which partial reforms coexist alongside politicisation and clientelism. This model, observed in parts of Central Europe, would constrain Romania’s convergence prospects and weaken its strategic positioning within the EU.

 

Governance scenarios for 2025-2030

Romania’s governance pathway over the coming decade could evolve along three major trajectories. In a Democratic Consolidation scenario, Romania stabilises its political landscape, strengthens judicial independence, and improves administrative capacity. Digitalisation deepens, procurement becomes more transparent, and OECD accession accelerates reform momentum.

A Fragmentation and Populist Surge scenario would see continued political volatility, increasing ideological polarisation, and persistent turnover at ministerial levels. Governance coherence would deteriorate, patronage networks would expand, and public trust would erode further.

The Hybrid Governance scenario – perhaps the most plausible in the short term – would feature partial reforms, uneven institutional performance, and selective implementation of recommendations linked to EU and OECD mechanisms. Some institutions would function predictably, while others would remain exposed to politicisation and inefficiency.

 

Policy directions

Romania’s governance trajectory at this historic juncture demands not only incremental adjustments but a strategic consolidation of reforms that align institutional performance with European democratic standards. The latest European Commission Rule of Law Reports and OECD accession assessments underscore the urgent need for predictable policymaking, strengthened integrity frameworks, and coherent administrative coordination. The country’s long‑term stability depends on a political commitment to shielding the judiciary from partisan influence, providing prosecutors with stable and adequate resources, and ensuring that anti-corruption bodies operate free from institutional interference.

Reforming the civil service remains essential. Merit-based recruitment and reduced political turnover would foster continuity, prevent policy reversals, and reinforce public trust. Equally important is the strengthening of local and regional administrative capacity, where Romania continues to experience deep disparities affecting EU funds absorption, procurement quality, and service delivery. Investments in digitalisation must prioritise interoperability, cybersecurity, and citizen-centric systems to reduce bureaucratic friction and enhance transparency.

As populist narratives reshape political competition, Romania must adopt a comprehensive communication strategy that counters disinformation, explains reforms in clear language, and positions government action within a broader European and democratic framework. This is critical for restoring institutional legitimacy and stabilising expectations in an electorate increasingly drawn to anti-establishment and welfare‑chauvinistic messages.

Finally, the convergence of EU and OECD conditionality offers Romania a unique opportunity: to transition from reactive governance to a mature, strategic state capable of long-term planning. Achieving this requires political consensus on foundational reforms, investments in administrative professionalism, and a renewed commitment to transparent, accountable governance. Romania’s capacity to navigate the pressures of populism, regional fragmentation, and institutional strain will determine whether it consolidates its democratic gains or drifts toward a hybrid governance model.

 

References

Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2015). Populists in Power. Routledge.

European Commission. (2020–2024). Rule of Law Reports: Country Chapter on Romania.

European Commission. (2023). European Semester Country Report: Romania.

European Commission. (2025). Eurobarometer 103: Public Opinion in the European Union. Directorate-General for Communication.

European Commission. (2022). Implementation of the EU Whistleblower Directive in Member States. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press.

National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA). (2023). Annual Activity Report.

Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT). (2023). Annual Report.

National Integrity Agency (ANI). (2023). Annual Integrity Report.

OECD. (2023–2024). Governance and Public Administration Reviews: Romania. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

OECD. (2024). OECD Accession Review: Romania – Governance and Integrity Standards.

Pirro, A. (2022). Populism in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Trajectory. Oxford University Press.

Transparency International. (2015–2024). Corruption Perceptions Index: Romania Profiles.

European Commission. (2024). Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) – Country Profile: Romania.

 

Photo source: PxHere.com.

 
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