TheMarketForIdeas

For centuries, international relations have been defined by the rise or fall of great powers, but in today’s architectures we might be witnessing the emergence of a system where no power is truly great enough to lead. In this death of polarity what purpose do the uni-, bi-, multi- prefixes still have?

Contemporary political and economic discourse is increasingly framed through the lens of multipolarity. From multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, where Secretary-General António Guterres repeatedly stresses the erosion of unipolar dominance, to major financial actors like Morgan Stanley, which integrate multipolar dynamics into their global investment strategies, the narrative has gained remarkable traction. Across European capitals, policymakers emphasize this perspective, with figures such as French President Emmanuel Macron portraying Europe as a potential “third pole” (1). Meanwhile, in the Global South, the expansion of BRICS is celebrated as tangible evidence of an emerging multipolar order (2).

Nonetheless, despite this seemingly universalised paradigmatic and pragmatic consensus, some would argue that the claim remains fundamentally wrong, but not because we operate under a bipolar aegis. Instead, current systemic modulations and reverberations paved the way for the emergence of an anti-polar (or at least non-polar) international system, one in which no nation-state possesses sufficient capabilities to establish and comprehensively maintain a truly meaningful global hegemony.

This narrative misalignment (ideational misdiagnosis) is particularly consequential nowadays, as the global order is marked not only by signs of American (Western-oriented) semi-voluntary retrenchment, but also by structural constraints on the People’s Republic of China’s ascent that hinder its assumption of global primacy in the following decades. Thus, what we are witnessing may therefore not be a linear transition from unipolarity to bipolarity, where dominance is co-created through joint leadership across the Washington-Beijing axis, but rather the erosion of polarity itself. We are then left with a global order in which power is increasingly fragmented, dissipated through local nodes, deeply interdependent and subject to significant regional limitations, all of which renders it almost impossible for any single actor, or even through bandwagoning, to exercise decisive control over international outcomes.

The space between poles – where true power reigns

Polarity refers not simply to the count of states possessing substantial outward-facing capabilities, but to the structural distribution of power that enables actors to exercise autonomous, system-shaping influence for self-gains. In Kenneth Waltz’s works, like most other international relations (IR) scholars, polarity is determined by the number of great powers capable to endure and prevail in major and prolonged conflicts without external support (3) (4). Yet, as traditional power structures tend to move away from hierarchy and become decentralised, what are the implications when no nation-state can assume a leading role?

Thus, the notion of a non-polar global architecture arises when the foundations for Great Power status (economic scale, military capabilities, technological sophistication and global reach) become either insufficient for systemic dominance or so interdependent with the periphery (non-centre poles) that independent actions become prohibitively costly. Hence, Joseph Nye’s power transition theory underlines that great powers must control at least 10–15% of global GDP and sustain annual military expenditures exceeding 200 billion EUR just to retain their outward stance (6). Even though a decent threshold, in today’s globalised networks these merely quantitative benchmarks no longer translate seamlessly into usable or decisive power as they do not account for prestige, influence, sustainable socio-economic might etc.

In this context, the structural imbalance is particularly evident in the current distribution of capabilities, which turns into neither top-down nor bottom-up, but rather fluid. For instance, the US and PRC account for 52% of the world’s military spending and command a combined GDP of almost 50 trillion EUR (7) (8) (9). Nevertheless, recent geopolitical shifts showcased that their ability to unilaterally or even jointly shape global outcomes has moved from a binarized logic to a third way, with middle powers taking more proactive roles. Also, their rivalry now extends beyond “normal” means and integrates economic, technological, environmental, digital, and cultural domains as well, which demands even more efforts to ensure primacy.

When the leviathans sleep – failed bipolar transition and frail status quo

The structural advantages that underpinned the Washington Consensus unipolar moment, from the 1990s to mid-2010s, have gradually eroded. Hence, the US share of global GDP fell from roughly 40% in 1960 to 24% in the digital age, while a sovereign debt exceeding 33 trillion EUR constrains the fiscal flexibility required for sustained global engagement (8). Although Washington spends over 875 billion EUR annually on its military-industrial complex, technological diffusion, asymmetric warfare and increased costs of projecting power in complex geopolitical environments have diminished the strategic ROI (9).

Hence, the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan signalled the limitations of military superiority in delivering favourable political outcomes. At the same time, the US array of alliances, which once amplified its hegemonic stance, now functions as institutionalised arenas of bargaining, with partners demanding greater voice and output, constraining unilateral decision-taking. Domestically, the durability of international leadership is further challenged by socio-economic shifts, widening inequality, and transformative political attitudes, which have produced a bipartisan tendency toward selective retrenchment rather than expansive global engagement (10) (11).

On the other hand, PRC’s trajectory, often framed as a potential hegemonic transition, reveals a parallel set of systemic constraints. Its impressive economic rise remains dependent on Western collaboration and market openness, albeit the rise of a huge internal middle class that can drive local consumption (12). Moreover, while educational and R&D reforms are taking place, Beijing remains reliant on imported components across several strategic industries such as aeronautics, spacecraft or semiconductors (13).

Furthermore, initiatives like the Belt and Road, frequently cited as evidence of PRC’s global ambitions, generated both influence and liabilities, as debt distress among partners produced backlash and undermined long-term cooperation (14) (15). Also, in terms of defence and security, all PRC branches are rapidly modernising and changing command structure, but until some of its major projects are completed in 2030–2050, experts believe it lacks the logistics and external hubs to sustain prolonged conflicts worldwide. Moreover, long-term demographic, energy and environmental pressures further complicate the translation of material capacity into global leadership until sustainable transition is achieved (16).

Taken together, these overarching tendencies suggest that neither Washington nor Beijing meet the criteria for dominant, stable and sustainable hegemonic leadership as defined in realist terms. Hence, rather than signalling a transition from unipolarity to bipolarity, the emerging order might be conceptualised as anti-polar, as power becomes widely dispersed, structurally interdependent and increasingly incapable of creating dominant formats (17).

Dispersed authority – the splintage of global governance models

Evidence for the emergence of anti-polarity can be observed through the fragmentation of global governance networks across institutions, issue areas, and actor constellations. International organisations increasingly reflect diffusion rather than concentration of power. For example, the UNSC is frequently immobilised by veto politics, while WTO, IMF and the World Bank Group have all failed to deliver game-changing updates on trade agreements since the early 2000s (18).

Similarly, groups like G7 and G20 generate communiqués, but struggle to produce binding or coordinated responses to the challenges faced. Rather than hierarchical steering, international governance is increasingly characterised by what Acharya calls “multiplexity”, a spatiality where authority is dispersed among nation-states, regional institutions and non-state actors (19).

Additionally, power distribution varies considerably across issue domains, creating what Zürn terms “issue-specific hegemony”, with climate governance involving simultaneous leadership by the EU, US, PRC and transnational city networks, civil society organisations and private sector unions, none of which can impose on others. In technological standard-setting and norms construction, American tech giants, Chinese manufacturers and European regulators all overlap their spheres of influence. Finance remains formally dollar-dominated, yet parallel infrastructures such as China’s E-Yuan or the EU’s INSTEX signal a slow diversification of authority and alternative monetary propositions (20) (21).

Non-state actors further complicate structural polarity by generating divergent forms of governance power. Transnational corporations possess market valuations and capital inflows larger than the GDP of most states, while philanthropic institutions like the Gates Foundation rival WHO in health expenditure and involvement, creating micro-hybrid orders where state authority competes with local and specialised power (22).

Regional powers increasingly navigate this turbulent environment through hedging rather than alignment. These players simultaneously engage in cooperative frameworks with one or another leading power, but retain significant economic, energy or defence ties with others (23) (24). Middle powers—including Canada, Australia, South Korea and Brazil—leverage networked coalitions to shape outcomes on common issues like pandemic response or environmental policy, but tend to switch sides on other domains (25). Also, BRICS, often revered as a marker of multipolarity, illustrates the downfall of polarity per se, since despite enlargement its members remain divided by conflicting strategic visions and unable to generate coherent alternatives to the western-led liberal order (26).

Going off the beaten tracks

Technological advancements, digital spatialities and creative or innovative economics further reinforce these divergences and create global rifts. Despite efforts to achieve “technological sovereignty”, no major power possesses the full spectrum of capabilities across critical domains, ensuring continued interdependence even amid decoupling strategies (27) (28). Platform competition similarly fragments digital governance and internet dialogue efforts, as American, Chinese and European ecosystems increasingly encroach on each other’s territory. Moreover, global supply chains—revealed during the pandemic to be deeply troubling—remain the backbone of economic growth, regardless of calls for local reorientation (29) (30).

Thus, governance shifts toward adaptive, flexible, and networked arrangements, whilst state and non-state actors navigate less hierarchical and more decentralised landscapes. Overlapping spheres create uniquely regionalised constraints and cooperation patterns, with influence gained through shaping mechanisms rather than asserting dominance.

While the anti-polar world might seem anarchical, these dynamics do not entail the disappearance of dominant power, but rather its transition towards relational rather than positional, domain-specific rather than generalised, and network-embedded rather than hierarchically exercised forms. Recognising these patterns is not pessimism, but analytical clarity, underscoring that no single actor—or coalition—possesses the autonomy to impose a global systemic order. The central challenge for contemporary governance becomes not managing great-power rivalries, but coordinating complex interdependencies across spaces where hegemonic authority is absent. Stability will depend not on concentration of power, but on how actors can govern without poles.

Notes

(1) Atlas Institute (n.d.) Europe’s Geopolitical Opportunity: A Third Pole.

(2) Almendron (n.d.) The Myth of Multipolarity.

(3) Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill.

(4) Waltz, K. N. (2000) ‘Structural realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25(1), pp. 5–41.

(5) Krauthammer, C. (1990) ‘The unipolar moment’, Foreign Affairs, 70(1), pp. 23–33.

(6) Nye, J. S. (2011) The Future of Power. PublicAffairs.
(7) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2024) SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

(8) World Bank (2024) World Development Indicators Database; Congressional Budget Office (2024) The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034.

(9) U.S. Department of Defense (2024) Fiscal Year 2025 Defense Budget Request.
(10) Ikenberry, G. J. (2018) ‘The end of liberal international order?’, International Affairs, 94(1), pp. 7–23.

(11) Pew Research Center (2023) America’s Place in the World 2023.

(12) Lardy, N. R. (2019) The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China? Peterson Institute for International Economics.

(13) Semiconductor Industry Association (2024) Global Semiconductor Market Analysis.

(14) Hillman, J. E. (2021) The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Belt and Road Initiative. Yale University Press.

(15) U.S. Department of Defense (2023) Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC; Vine, D. (2020) Base Nation. Metropolitan Books.

(16) United Nations (2022) World Population Prospects 2022; World Bank (2016) The Cost of Air Pollution.

(17) Waltz, K. N. (2000) ‘Structural realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25(1), pp. 5–41.

(18) Hoekman, B. M. (2020) ‘The WTO: Functions, status and reform’, World Trade Review, 19(4), pp. 591–610; Head, J. (2021) The Future of the Global Economic Organizations. Brill.

(19) Segal, A. (2020) The Hacked World Order. PublicAffairs; Acharya, A. et al. (2023) ‘Multipolar or multiplex?’, International Affairs, 99(6), pp. 2339–2365.

(20) Zuboff, S. (2019) The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. PublicAffairs.

(21) Prasad, E. S. (2021) The Future of Money. Belknap Press; Eichengreen, B. (2019) Golden Fetters. Oxford University Press.

(22) Slaughter, A. M. (2004) A New World Order. Princeton University Press.

(23) Jaishankar, S. (2020) The India Way. HarperCollins.

(24) Bradford, A. (2020) The Brussels Effect. Oxford University Press.

(25) Chapnick, A. (1999) ‘The middle power’, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 7(2), pp. 73–82.

(26) Stuenkel, O. (2020) The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lexington Books; Eichengreen, B. (2021) ‘Will the dollar’s reign end?’, Project Syndicate.

(27) Segal, A. (2020) The Hacked World Order. PublicAffairs.

(28) Zuboff, S. (2019) The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. PublicAffairs.

(29) Baldwin, R. and Freeman, R. (2022) Globotics: Globalization, Robotics and the Future of Work. Oxford University Press.

(30) Slaughter, A. M. (2004) ‘Disaggregated sovereignty’, Government and Opposition, 39(2), pp. 159–190; Kobrin, S. J. (2017) ‘Bricks and mortar in a borderless world’, Global Strategy Journal, 7(2), pp. 200–219.