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Over the past two hundred years, Chile and Argentina have developed a fruitful bilateral relationship, marked by ups and downs, where any conflict was resolved through agreements and negotiations. However, the greatest difficulties have arisen in delimiting the borders for the Southern regions, specifically the Campos de Hielo Sur/ The Southern Patagonian Ice Field, where each state mapped out spaces that overlapped graphically. There have been multiple attempts to solve this issue by establishing a definitive limit, engaging in high-level conversations between the governments involved. Despite numerous territorial concessions from Chile, there still remain unresolved aspects and unjustified decisions. 

Introduction 

The dispute between Argentina and Chile regarding Campos de Hielo Sur is not only a matter of territoriality; it holds immense geopolitical significance. This is due to the access it provides to the Pacific Ocean and even sovereignty over freshwater resources, crucial for the future of humanity and for the littoral states that require water for agriculture and industry as well as to support their rising populations. Water, one of the vital elements of the planet, has always been universally essential for the well-being of populations, ecosystems, and for the functioning of various activities and sectors. Climate change has brought about a loss of water reserves due to decreased precipitation and ongoing anthropogenic exploitation, rendering areas containing water resources highly important strategically speaking. Undoubtedly, the potential of this region is relevant not only for economic and energy security but also development in a wider sense.

The purpose of the article is to present the subject of delimiting Campos de Hielo Sur as an unresolved controversy between Chile and Argentina, considering the negative outcomes in failing to establish a definitive border. This impediment represents a real issue, given the geopolitical interest in the region and the inability to fully exploit the potential of the available resources. Timely protection and conservation of these vast freshwater reserves is crucial for both countries. Additionally, climate change and glaciers could potentially lead to a dynamic frontier and therefore further challenges regarding established borders alongside new territorial claims. 

Argentina’s territorial expansion – one treaty at a time 

The Southern Patagonian Ice Field is located in the Andes Cordillera Mountain range, straddling the border between Argentina and Chile. It spans approximately 350 km in length, covering an area of around 16,800 km² and represents the largest mass of ice in the Southern Hemisphere, excluding Antarctica. Moreover, it ranks as one of the main tourist attractions in the region, standing third in the world after Antarctica and Greenland in terms of extent and amount of stored ice. The resources of the territory are used by both states situated on the eastern and western sides of the Andes, but the majority of the surface area falls under the sovereignty of Chile, which owns more than 85%.

The first discoveries of the Ice Fields are attributed to the indigenous people, who lived in the surrounding areas. In 1557, the governor of Chile sent a ship named the San Luis to explore the Strait of Magellan, and its crew was among the first foreigners to lay eyes upon the ancient ice. The northern and southern portions of the Ice Field are remnants of a much larger ice sheet that reached its maximum extent approximately 18,000 years ago. To distinguish between the northern and southern parts, the latter is referred to as the Continental Ice Field for Argentina and the Southern Ice Field for Chile (Werner, 2020).

By the end of the 19^th century, the delimitation of borders was far from being a settled matter in many South American countries, a situation to which Chile and Argentina were no exception. In 1881, the two states signed a treaty designating the Andes Mountains as a natural border between them. However, the phrase “high peaks that separate the waters” led to dual interpretations in an area of glaciers. Rectifications to the initial treaty were necessary and, in 1893, the application of the divortium aquarum principle was established. According to this principle, waters flowing into the Pacific belonged to Chile, while those flowing into the Atlantic were Argentina’s. The border situation regarding the Southern Ice Field, a little-explored and geographically challenging area surrounded by permanent ice, seemed resolved in 1898, when experts Diego Barros Arana (Chile) and Francisco Moreno (Argentina) agreed on a straight-line dividing Chile from Argentina, passing through Mount Fitz Roy and including Mount Daudet in Chile’s ownership. In other words, Campos de Hielo Sur was recognized as entirely under the sovereignty of Chile (Sanhueza, 2012).

The situation changed during the 20^th century when Argentina expressed its desire to claim Laguna Del Desierto, located on the eastern slope of the Southern Patagonian Ice Field, and began sending patrols to the area. Chileans were asked to pay taxes to Argentine authorities. Consequently, in 1965, a small group of Chilean officers, having been informed that the Argentine gendarmerie was claiming the territory, became victims of a tragic incident at the border, resulting in the death of Lieutenant Hernán Merino Correa. This event triggered an uproar, but the governments decided to engage in discussions before escalating into a major conflict. Argentina’s territorial claim was submitted to the Arbitration of the Latin American Court, and finally, in 1994, its sovereignty over Laguna Del Desierto was recognized (Manzano Iturra, 2019). This decision marked a significant territorial loss for Chile and negatively influenced its domestic situation.

In the years 1990-1991, Argentina’s territorial claims continued to surface, reopening the issue seemingly settled in 1898 through the Experts’ Report. The border between Mount Fitz Roy and Cerro Daudet was renegotiated by Argentina, claiming 2,500 km² of the Southern Patagonian Ice Field. At that time, Chile lacked official maps at the necessary scale to negotiate this demand in its favour, and some voices argued that there was no intention to do so. Therefore, the task of the new demarcation was transferred to the Chile-Argentina Mixed Boundary Commission. Of the total 2,500 km² claimed by Argentina, approximately 1,000 km² are in the so-called Zone B, between Mount Fitz Roy and Cerro Murallon, for which no official demarcations had been established to date. The revision of the border between Cerro Murallon and Cerro Daudet in favour of Argentina sparked another wave of discontent among the public opinion, with citizens questioning what they stood to gain from willingly ceding to Argentina 2,500 km² of Chilean territory of immense beauty, with ancient ice and part of the Torres del Paine National Park.

Thus, the question arises as to why Chile agreed to reopen seemingly closed negotiations and, more importantly, why it accepted such a territorial loss. Historical evidence suggests that Chile should not have agreed to negotiate a new border in Campos de Hielo Sur, having solid arguments to uphold the demarcation established in 1898. Evidently, Chile’s diplomacy was deficient in protecting its own national interests, as this decision was not based on legal or geographical arguments. Some authors argue that the main benefit pursued by Chile was to facilitate the approval of the Mining Treaty of 1997, favouring the exploitation of mineral deposits in areas adjacent to the border with Argentina. In other words, Chilean diplomacy agreed to transform a demarcation issue into a delimitation one, giving up the fixed border for the sake of its “friendship” with Argentina. Internally, this event was categorized as inexplicable and attributed to an error on Chile’s part, whose diplomacy was incapable of defending the first thing a state is obligated to protect—its own territorial integrity. The lack of knowledge among Chilean politicians about the Ice Fields may have acted as a complicit factor in the mistakes and errors made by those technically responsible for this sensitive issue. Ice held little value compared to the ambition for gold, which was already of interest to certain transnational mining companies. However, the opportunity cost of Chile staking sovereignty over the Ice Field appears to have been a miscalculation, as the ambitious agenda associated with the Mining Treaty failed.

The 1998 Agreement also involved the delimitation of the area between Mount Fitz Roy and Cerro Murallon. However, consensus has not been reached to date for this area due to Argentina’s territorial claims. The Argentine border has shifted more than 30 km westwards, towards the ridges of the Mariano Moreno Cordillera, with the state justifying its action on the fact that the existence of this landmark was not recognized when the previous border was established. The Chilean side consider this argument false, asserting that the existence of this mountain range was recorded even during the British arbitration of 1902 (Marangunic, 2021).

In 2010, the situation in Campos de Hielo Sur gained intense media attention as Argentine maps, circulating through various electronic means, continued to include the disputed area under full Argentine sovereignty (Manzano Iturra, 2019). It seemed that Argentina took advantage of its neighbour’s silence and inaction, appropriating the territory it claimed through the 1998 Agreement. The Argentine government’s actions to accelerate progress on the Campos de Hielo Sur issue demonstrated its intention to link this problem with the Falklands/Malvinas claim, which was strongly reactivated that same year. Chile’s reaction was limited to sending diplomatic notes and monotonously repeating that, politically, the issue of the border with Argentina had been resolved through the 1998 Agreement. Argentina’s persistence in resolving the issue as soon as possible is noted, considering the “slowness” of Chile, which wanted to avoid another failure, given the unfavourable situation with Laguna del Desierto. 

Diplomatic inflection points 

The border dispute between Argentina and Chile has been a challenging and longstanding issue between the two states for centuries. This meant a significant commitment from both actors to define their border through a series of treaties and diplomatic agreements aimed at maintaining peace between the states involved.

From this perspective, the Southern Patagonian Ice Field stands out as one of the most important water reserves in the Southern Hemisphere. Over time, a series of high-level diplomatic discussions have taken place between the governments involved in this conflict (Manzano Iturra, 2019, pp. 173-175). It is important to bring into discussion the maps as well, which have transformed a once amicable relationship between the two states into a tense one due to their differing interpretations.

Since 1855, agreements and disagreements have occurred between Argentina and Chile regarding the border demarcation between the two states. The dispute that arose between the two states concerning their territorial and maritime boundaries is quite complex. Besides the issue of claiming rights over the Southern Patagonian Ice Field, there were also other problems related to the Eastern region of the Beagle Channel (United Nations, 2006, p. 55).

The first diplomatic attempt to resolve the territorial conflict between Argentina and Chile took place in 1856 by signing the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation of 1856 by the two states. Article 39 of the treaty proposed the use of direct diplomatic negotiations and arbitration to settle disputes. It established that borders should be delimited based on the uti possidetis principle, more specifically, each country should retain the territories it had before the independence wars of Chile and Argentina, which began around 1810 (Derecho Internacional Publico, 2011). The 1856 Treaty represented a landmark agreement in the history of Argentina-Chile relations, but, due to its limitations, including the evolving political environment, it failed to provide a lasting solution to the disputes between the two states. Consequently, subsequent treaties and diplomatic efforts were necessary to effectively address the border demarcation conflict and territorial claims between the two nations. Despite the shortcomings of the 1856 Treaty, it laid the groundwork for future negotiations and discussions between Argentina and Chile.

A new diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict between Argentina and Chile was attempted in 1881 when the two states agreed to sign a new treaty called the 1881 Border Treaty. Attempts to clarify the dispute over territorial rights to Southern Patagonia had been unsuccessful until 1881 when Chile was compelled to make an important decision on this issue due to its ongoing war with Bolivia and Peru. To avoid conflict with Argentina as well, Chilean President Aníbal Pinto authorized his envoy, Diego Barros Arana, to cede as much territory as necessary to prevent Argentina from entering the war on the side of Bolivia and Peru (Morris, 1989, p. 62).

The conflict involving Chile presented an opportunity for Argentina to take advantage of the situation and negotiate advantageous boundaries in Patagonia (Muñoz Sougarret, 2014, p. 76). However, the positive turn of events for Chile in the war forced Argentine diplomacy to opt for an agreement inhibiting the possibility of a war over Patagonian territories. Thus, the 1881 Border Treaty was born (Muñoz Sougarret, 2014, p. 76). This treaty defined the borders between the two states through articles 1, 2, 3, and 5 (United Nations, 2006, pp. 85-87), dividing it into three parts. The border between Chile and the Argentine Republic runs from north to south, up to the parallel of 52 latitude - Cordillera de los Andes; the second part represents the limit to the north of the Strait of Magellan, and the last part in the region of the Beagle Channel (United Nations, op. cit). Despite clarifying these border issues and the territorial rights Argentina has over certain sectors of the Patagonian region as well as Chilean rights over the Strait of Magellan, the treaty brought about a new bone of contention, namely the route of the Beagle Channel, which was not specified in the treaty. Thus, in article 3 of this treaty, it was stated that “(...) all the islands south of the Beagle Channel to Cape Horn and those west of Tierra del Fuego will belong to Chile” (United Nations, 2006, p. 86, art 3). This treaty implemented a series of border delimitations between Argentina and Chile with a high degree of complexity, making it challenging to understand where the border begins and ends, even for the states involved. The situation with the Southern Patagonian Ice Field remained uncertain, as the states did not fully agree with the delineations proposed by the treaty. Although the Patagonian border was officially agreed upon in 1881, territorial conflicts and tensions have since persisted and taken on new forms (Gale-Detrich & Ednie, 2023, p. 5).

In the 1881 Border Treaty and the subsequent agreement, namely the 1893 Border Protocol and the 1898 Act, both Argentina and Chile asserted their sovereignty over Patagonia and agreed on the peaceful definition of the border. Both states considered the Andes Mountains as the Western border but disputed the sovereignty over the Strait of Magellan and the islands of the Beagle Channel (Gale-Detrich & Ednie, 2023, p. 153).

The arbitration case of 1902 (known as the General Arbitration Treaty between Chile and Argentina of 1902) – overseen by the British Crown – established the international border line between the two states with greater precision, with Francisco Moreno serving on the border commission (Wakild, 2017). The agreement between Chile and Argentina envisioned submitting future border disputes to the arbitration of a power considered neutral and possessing the necessary characteristics to make a fair decision. This arbitration case established a general framework for resolving border disputes in situations where direct negotiations failed to reach an agreement. However, diplomatic conflicts persisted, especially regarding the Southern Patagonian Ice Field (Sopeña, 2008).

The establishment of national parks in the frontier zones of Southern Patagonia represented a highly effective strategy by both states to secure territorial sovereignty over partially unexplored areas. For instance, in the Argentine part of Southern Patagonia, the Perito Moreno and Los Glaciares National Parks were established in 1937. In Chile, the Jeinimeni and Lago Cochrane (Tamango) National Reserves were created in Southern Patagonia in 1967, closely followed by Bernardo O’Higgins National Park in 1969 (Gale-Detrich & Ednie, 2023, p. 153).

In 1965, a minor confrontation occurred between Chilean and Argentine armed forces, taking place north of El Chaltén and resulting in the death of a soldier. Ongoing border disputes have occasionally pushed the two countries to the brink of war (Gale-Detrich & Ednie, 2023, p. 37).

Until the resolution of the dispute over the sovereignty of certain islands in the Beagle Channel and the Southern Patagonian Ice Field, the relations between Argentina and Chile have historically featured recurrent diplomatic tensions and military crises due to their differences in territorial delimitation and mutual distrust. The relationship between Argentina and Chile remained less than amicable for this reason until the signing of the 1984 Peace and Friendship Treaty (Magnani & Barreto, 2022, pp. 113-114); immediately afterwards, both states began working towards strengthening their bilateral relationship.

In 1985, the two states founded the Binational Commission for Cooperation and Physical Integration. In 1991, the Economic Cooperation Agreement was established, and later that year, the two countries signed an Environmental Treaty accompanied by a Specific Additional Protocol on Shared Water Resources. These laid the groundwork for the creation of an Argentine-Chilean Water Resources Technical Group, which was officially constituted in Buenos Aires in December 1996 (Gale-Detrich & Ednie, 2023, p. 154). In 1997, the two countries took another step forward in the integration process, signing the Treaty on Mining Integration and Cooperation and the Cooperation Protocol (Schweitzer, 2019).

The signing of the Peace and Friendship Agreement in 1998 marked a significant moment in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict over the Southern Patagonian Ice Field. Both countries agreed to conduct joint scientific research to create a basis for future agreements, supporting a collaborative approach to dispute resolution. However, the preparation of the agreed-upon map, which was going to be drawn up by a Joint Boundary Commission, was never finalized; thus, tensions endured between the two states (Gale-Detrich & Ednie, 2023, p. 154).

The demarcation of territorial boundaries between the two states by means of maps emphasized the image of one state against the other, privileging the competition between them and the struggle for territorial claims in the Southern Patagonian Ice Field. With the definition of the central geographical aspects of the region, it can be observed that, from the beginning of their diplomatic relations, both Chile and Argentina have worked with overlapping maps, which were used to pursue territorial claims. Geographically, more than three-quarters of the Ice Fields belong to Chile and a smaller portion bordering Argentina. Certain concessions were made with the 1998 Agreement. For instance, Chile would have ceded a significant part of Hidden Lagoon to Argentina, in order to maintain friendly relations between the two states. Simultaneously, Article 3 of the 1998 Agreement states: “all waters that flow into and through the Santa Cruz River shall be considered for all purposes as Argentina’s own water resource.” This represents a tense situation for Chile, because owing to climate change, glaciers will melt in increasing quantities and subglacial rivers that are of Chilean origin will belong to Argentina if they flow into the Santa Cruz River. In other words, this issue will generate an unacceptable situation for Chile and a gain for Argentina, specifically up to135,000 million cubic meters of water in the form of ice (Marangunic, 2021). 

The current state of the conflict: case closed? 

The Chile – Argentina Mixed Boundary Commission has not made any major progress, as so far there are no details on the demarcation works of the border landmarks, as provided for in the 1998 Agreement. As a resul, there is an area of approximately 1,000 km² between Mount Fitz Roy and Cerro Murallon that is still under demarcation. This issue threatens the stability of the region, as it could potentially lead to a territorial conflict for which solutions have been sought over the years. More critical than the actual demarcation of geographical boundaries is the quantity of freshwater stored in these glaciers, a rare and strategically important resource for the development of nations.

While official Argentine cartography clearly illustrates its claims in Campos de Hielo Sur as a resolved issue, Chilean maps continue to categorize the area as disputed, awaiting delineation. Under these circumstances, it raises the question of whether Argentina complies with to the provisions outlined in the 1998 Agreement (Marangunic, Guzmán & Ipinza, 2020).

A problem that will impact the bilateral relations between Chile and Argentina is linked to global warming, which leads to glacier melting and changes in the situations of lakes and lagoons or alterations in river courses, as stipulated in Article 3 of the 1998 Agreement (Manzano Iturra K., 2015). What will happen to the subglacial rivers of Argentine origin if they end up flowing into Chilean oceanic fjords? Similarly, if Chilean glaciers flow towards the Santa Cruz basin, will they become water resources for Argentina? Clearly, the parties will be reluctant to accept these situations.

The implementation of the 1998 Agreement as an instrument in the Southern Patagonian Ice Field border issue evidently prejudices Chile’s interests. It represents the result of a misguided strategy that sacrifices Chilean national territory in exchange for corporate political interests. Although Chile’s tendency so far has been to avoid international arbitration, relying on the principle that a negative outcome is more favourable than a poorly concluded legal process, Chile should reconsider this strategy, which entails harmful and enduring consequences for future generations.

Furthermore, there are certain deficiencies in the 1998 Agreement that are disadvantageous to Chile. Among these, the confusion between the terms “demarcation” and “delimitation” can be noted. The agreement specifies that the Chile-Argentina Mixed Boundary Commission’s role is to demarcate, meaning to establish landmarks for a previously defined boundary, which does not grant the authority to delimit, neither in the case of the border in Zone A nor in the disputed Zone B (Marangunic, 2021). In other words, there is a possibility that Chile may contest the accuracy of the territorial boundaries delimited in favour of Argentina in Zone A in the years to come.

The matter of the Southern Patagonian Ice Field is ongoing, despite the efforts of Santiago officials responsible for keeping it “secret.” This is not just a technical problem; it affects national security, posing a visible and concrete threat to Chile’s sovereignty over vast freshwater reserves. Therefore, it is an issue that must be addressed in relation to society, which is, in the end, the rightful owner of the national territory. This problem continues to be studied by the Mixed Boundary Commission, and the internal tensions in Chile and the “growing” territorial claims of Argentina prove that it is premature to declare it a “case closed.”

Interestingly, up to this point, despite numerous concessions made by Chile, Argentina has not yielded an inch in its territorial claims. Moreover, the proposed boundary in Zone B has managed to bring it a few kilometres closer to the Pacific Ocean. The question remains whether Chile will once again cede its territory in favour of its eastern neighbour. 

Quenching the quarrel: perspectives on conflict resolution 

The Argentina-Chile border dispute persists to this day. Resolving territorial disputes involves, first and foremost, political will and commitment to find lasting solutions. By adopting such approaches, Chile and Argentina could create a conducive framework for the peaceful resolution of their territorial issues.

One perspective for resolving this territorial conflict could involve renegotiating the terms of border delimitation outlined in the 1998 Treaty. It is important to take into account the fact that the tensions between Argentina and Chile regarding border demarcation date back many decades and the agreements and treaties they have signed over the years did not improve to a great extent these tensions. That’s why a new diplomatic approach is needed. There is plenty of evidence that Argentina is not respecting the 1998 Agreement, primarily through the presence of maps where a portion of the Southern Patagonian Ice Field, which is not demarcated, is unofficially claimed by Argentina. According to a recent map from 2010 covering the Southern Patagonian Ice Field, a significant number of kilometres in this region are represented as Argentinian territory (Manzano Iturra, 2016). The most recent disagreements arose after the publication of this map in Argentina, where the 1998 Treaty was ignored. Taking this case as an example, it is crucial for both states to play fair and not cheat in the battle in the border delimitation fight, as in the long run there may be negative consequences and the trust of “supporting states” may be lost.

Thus, a review of the border demarcation is needed, as it should be divided according to the rightful territorial claims. Additionally, using the argument of global warming and the new geographical changes it brings, Chile could bring up the possibility of renegotiating the territory ceded to Argentina, specifically The Hidden Lagoon, because it rightfully belongs to Chile. In other words, the two states could continue to seek the services of an international mediator or a neutral institution to facilitate negotiations and help them to find a mutually acceptable solution regarding the border demarcation in the Southern Patagonia area. 

Conclusions 

In conclusion, the Southern Patagonian Ice Field represents a geopolitically strategic region, particularly due to the critical natural resources it possesses, which are vital for the future of the states concerned (Argentina and Chile). As a result of phenomena such as the global effects of climate change on various regions worldwide, the most visible consequence is the loss of water supply in many places due to reduced precipitation, making areas with water resources crucial for state strategies. Undoubtedly, the disputed area is a region with significant potential not only for economic and energy development but also for the needs of the region’s inhabitants.

The last century in Argentina and Chile has been characterized by an ongoing dispute over the sovereignty over this region along with the three islands in the Beagle Channel, thus becoming the largest unresolved issues in national security for both states. This border dispute has led them to establish a relationship based on a logic of rivalry.

Although the 1998 agreement at Campos de Hielo Sur is in effect, this area has not yet concluded its demarcation, as the work carried out by the Joint Border Commission has not been completed. Consequently, a series of maps will continue to be created, providing geopolitical representation from Chile or Argentina, where some of those involved feel disadvantaged compared to others. 

Photo source: Wikimedia Commons. 

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