TheMarketForIdeas

History’s smoking gun still smouldering

In recent decades, particularly in the aftermath of the Second World War, Western Europe has sought to withdraw from the logic of realist geopolitics, still bearing the scars of the many wars that have shaped European history, seeking peace through interdependence, integration and intergovernmental leadership. Although most EU member states are NATO members with the exception of Malta, Cyprus, Austria and Ireland, and armed forces from Western European states have participated in conflicts abroad (e. g. Iraq, Afghanistan), the memory of war and the brutality of realism-driven politics is largely a relic best locked away, an ever-present ghost the EU guards against, confined to the borders of faraway lands – other continents, other countries outside the EU’s borders – that is, until Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine forced Western Europe to acknowledge the reality of war as an ever-present possibility right near its doorstep. The United States, in turn, underwent several shifts, from its ideological and geopolitical Cold War to a unipolar world order that eventually turned multipolar, seeking to maintain its international presence in a world where its dominance following the crash of the USSR began to face the emergence of new poles of power. The United States’ military (through NATO) and diplomatic intervention in the Yugoslav Wars, most notably in Serbia and Kosovo, mirrored its concern for global security in an increasingly globalized environment, a mindset which was further cemented in the US National Security Strategy of 2000. The 9/11 attacks and the ensuing war on terror redefined the US security strategy, further amplifying its focus on global security. In hindsight, the absence of an unclassified national security strategy in 2003 makes sense given the US-led invasion of Iraq. The United States’ approach has always been marked by a need to maintain its competitiveness while also focusing on cooperation with its allies with a focus on global peace. Yet the most recent document the White House Administration published in November 2025 marks a shift in tone as per its own admission. The United States’ National Security Strategy, is unapologetic in its realist approach, its realpolitik tone evident even as it declares itself “realistic without being realist”.

Ignoring its rather… unguarded propensity for praising President Trump’s vision and role as a savior of America’s prestige and prosperity, the document decries the previous administrations’ strategies as not being strategies at all, dismissing their visions as vague, disconnected from the United States’ needs, and unrealistically optimistic with regard to ensure both domestic prosperity and prominent involvement in international affairs while at the same time denouncing the United States’ traditional allies as taking advantage of US power in order to secure their own economic well-being and security at the detriment of the interests of the American people. The current strategy prides itself on being more pragmatic and realistic, asserting the will to safeguard the US’s own security first and foremost while taking active steps to ensure the US supremacy in all matters pertaining to military capabilities, business development, economic robustness, technological output, diplomatic influence and cultural reach (i. e. aspects of both hard power and, as the document explicitly states, soft power).

Realism: Rebranded. Revamped. Remastered. Repackaged.

Most interestingly, beyond priorities such as domestic security and protecting its borders, the American National Security Strategy outlines several interesting geopolitical priorities. Below are some of the more salient ones:

- “We want the world’s most robust, productive, and innovative energy sector.”

- “We want to maintain the United States’ unrivalled ‘soft power’ through which we exercise positive influence throughout the world that furthers our interests.”

- “We want to ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough to prevent and discourage mass migration to the United States; we want a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with us against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations.”

- “We want to support our allies in preserving the freedom and security of Europe, while restoring Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity.”

- “Restoring American energy dominance (in oil, gas, coal, and nuclear) and reshoring the necessary key energy components is a top strategic priority. Cheap and abundant energy will produce well-paying jobs in the United States, reduce costs for American consumers and businesses, fuel reindustrialization, and help maintain our advantage in cutting-edge technologies such as AI.”

- “Expanding our net energy exports will also deepen relationships with allies while curtailing the influence of adversaries, protect our ability to defend our shores, and – when and where necessary – enables us to project power.”

The national security strategy further emphasizes the United States’ assets in terms of military, market size, technological capabilities, diplomatic acumen and cultural reach, vowing to revitalize a competence-based industry, on prioritizing American workers, and on implementing policies to prevent what it perceives as opportunistic commercial practices that damage American interests. It touches on “peace through strength” and preventing other nations from threatening American dominance (classic markers of realist-driven geopolitics, despite the document insisting the strategy is not “realist” in this sense) while at the same time pledging to an ethos of non-interventionism (unless interventions are necessary) and working with allies to maintain this peace, with emphasis on fair treatment from its allies (the strategy does mention that the US wants its allies rich, prosperous and self-reliant). The US national security strategy then announces its corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (which asserted US preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, essentially warding off other powers from its sphere of influence), declaring the Western Hemisphere its geostrategic fiefdom. With regards to Asia, the strategy mentions “leading from a position of strength”, its trade-based approach with the Indo-Pacific a thinly veiled challenge to China’s commercial prominence with a goal to “rebalance [China’s] economy toward household consumption” while also deterring military threats. As for Europe, the United States commits to helping Europe reclaim the prestige the US deems lost due to political crises, unfavourable demographic trends and erosion of national identities and values; the US sets a goal to “help Europe correct its current trajectory” in order to maintain a strong system of alliances, which the document states would be best accomplished by privileging nation-states, “ending the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance” or “opening European markets to U. S. goods and services and ensuring fair treatment of U. S. workers and businesses”.

The Middle East, for its part, is seen as no longer a primary locus for deep American involvement, announcing the renunciation of America’s former insistence on enforcing human rights, opting instead to let reforms “develop organically” as opposed to forcefully imposing them, while acknowledging the importance of the Middle East’s energy resources and key geostrategic locations (e. g. the Strait of Hormuz). Special attention should be given to the mention of Iran – identified as the region’s “chief destabilizing force” albeit its nuclear program was weakened by the joint American-Israeli attacks from June 2025. The document further advises a revised stance towards the Middle East, one no longer motivated by energy concerns or great-power competition, but one revolving around investment and technological development, which looks all the more ironic in hindsight, given the current events. Not only that, but the document mentions that “…Conflict remains the Middle East’s most troublesome dynamic, but there is today less to this problem than headlines might lead one to believe.” Not anymore, it seems. Furthermore, the document stresses that the US should avoid “hectoring these nations – especially the Gulf monarchies – into abandoning their traditions and historic forms of government,” which one the one hand would make the United States’ current action seem like a glaring counterpoint, but on the other hand could be seen as a deliberate use of language to allow for interpretation (since it drew attention to Gulf monarchies and historic forms of government while Iran’s current theocracy is neither a de jure monarchy nor its traditional form of government).

Pax Americana… for a price: from Palpatine to Eliot Ness to Mad Max

At first glance, there seems to be a certain, subtle irony in the way the strategy prioritizes self-interest and non-interventionism, pledging to abandon the US’s previous role as the world’s police officer, yet committing to maintain a balance of power by preventing the emergence of global or even regional powers which, in some cases, would ultimately necessitate interventionism (either by the US all on its own or in conjunction with its allies). The additional irony of the US claiming to no longer wish to bear the burden of the world’s problems should not be lost on us upon reading the document and seeing a sizable chunk of its strategy mentioning direct US involvement in several key regions either to broker peace, recalibrate the balance of power, correct Europe’s trajectory and so on. Yet, upon a closer reading, and especially in light of the US strikes on Iran and Venezuela, the irony resolves itself as it becomes apparent that the US indeed no longer intends to be the world’s police officer. Rather, the US intends to be the world’s maverick. Since the early 2000s, the United States could be compared to Emperor Palpatine from the “Star Wars” franchise, attempting to enact its own version of order on the world by enforcing its own power and influence. The United States policy beginning with the Obama administration and continued under Joe Biden’s presidency could be compared more to Eliot Ness, an attempt at a more a by-the-book approach in cooperation with partners and international institutions. Now, the United States appears to have taken on a more “Mad Max”-like approach to international politics, flaunting the international order, explicitly sceptical of intergovernmental institutions and acting on its own. The United States’ attacks on Iran in summer 2025 and late February 2026 in addition to its attacks on Venezuela in early 2026 didn’t occur just under any circumstances. Besides the evident amount of preparation and groundwork that went into the attacks, they also occurred outside the framework of international law. The United States did not consult with its allies or seek approval from the United Nations Security Council. The message from the United States is clear: they will march to their own drumbeat and the rest of the world can either join in or lag behind.

Let us begin with Venezuela. Much has been written about the strategic relevance of Venezuela. Let us briefly note them for the sake of clarity. According to Worldometers.info, Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil reserves, clocking in at about 18% of the world’s total reserves according to 2016 estimates; per the same source’s 2017 figures, Venezuela comes in eighth in terms of proven gas reserves, nearly 3% of the world’s total (for reference, the US holds about 4. 65%). Not only that, but according to Deutsche Welle, Venezuela’s economic and energy relations with China have increased to the point where Venezuela owed China between $60 billion and $70 billion. More generally, a 2023 Bloomberg Línea article highlights the extent to which Latin American countries are indebted to China due to infrastructure, energy and telecommunication loans amounting to upwards of $130 billion, quoting the dean of the School of Management at Colombia’s Universidad de Los Andes who cites these loans as evidence of China’s long-term geopolitical interest and influence. Venezuela, specifically, is a market not just for Chinese technology and telecommunications, but also for armaments, in addition to their ideological affinities. The linked Deutsche Welle article also points out Russia’s interests in the region, including its arms deals with the Chávez government and the military support Russia provided for his successor, Nicolás Maduro, when his presidency was contested by then US-backed Juan Guaidó. In addition, an analysis by West Point’s Modern War Institute further underscores that, beyond Venezuela’s considerable gold reserves and beyond the narcoterrorism rhetoric outlined in the US National Security Strategy (which would implicate Colombia and Mexico far more than Venezuela and the Caribbean), Venezuela is situated on important commercial and supply chain routes that China is heavily invested in both financially and geopolitically, gaining leverage in the region via substantial investments akin to its approach in Sub-Saharan Africa; the analysis deems Venezuela less of a central problem and more as an extension of the United States’ competition with China, Iran and Russia.

Further strengthening this perspective, Defence24.com highlights the differentiated involvement of the US’s rivals in the region: Russia’s military support and cooperation ever since Hugo Chávez’s administration, China’s financial, technological and infrastructural aid, and Iran’s support in matters of asymmetric defense, while the Atlantic Council asserts that Venezuela has supported Iran-backed Hezbollah. The key points highlighted that, as Venezuela and Iran have continued deepening their relationship especially under former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez – what with both being OPEC members as energy producers and struggling with Western sanctions – Hezbollah cells have taken root on Venezuelan soil. An analysis by Rand from March 2025 confirms extensive Hezbollah activities in Latin America, showing how the region is used extensively for financing terrorist activities, perpetrating fraud, smuggling and contraband operations (including drug trafficking), and suspicions of Hezbollah benefitting from the gold trade between Iran and Venezuela; the Defence24. com source corroborates this with reports of Israel busting a gold smuggling ring that Iran and Hezbollah benefitted from these activities. Brazilian reports dating as recently as 2023 and 2024 have also revealed that Hezbollah had been recruiting Brazilian nationals for organizing and carrying out terrorist attacks, especially against Jewish communities throughout Latin America, and Hezbollah’s losses in Lebanon due to Israeli attacks led to several of its commanders fleeing to Latin America in 2025. In addition, the US Treasury issued a report in late 2025 accusing Venezuela and Iran of engaging in extensive trade involving arms such as military drones and missiles, violating sanctions imposed on Iran and threatening to destabilize commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The illicit arms trade goes as far back as 2006. The pattern of attack becomes clearer the more we examine the interplay between the two countries: the oil connection as major OPEC member states (and therefore with the ability to influence oil production and exports); the gold trade connection (bypassing sanctions imposed on Iran and using Hezbollah as proxies to that effect); the arms trade connection; the diplomatic aid; the illegal operations in Latin America (drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal mining etc. ). The attacks launched by the United States begin to look less like wanton acts of military posturing and more like attempts to disrupt what it perceived to be an axis that threatened national and regional security, in addition to attempts to strengthen its influence in the Western Hemisphere while also undercutting China’s clout.

Geopolitical Bagging and Tagging

The attack on Venezuela makes therefore some sense from a geopolitical and military perspective in line with the US National Security Strategy: an energy-rich country in the Western Hemisphere that also happens to be situated on very important trade routes for both the United States and its geopolitical rivals. It also touches into the provision on interventionism stipulated in the document: only when necessary. The United States wasted no time and pulled no punches in announcing that it’d secure the energy reserves of the Latin American country, as Donald Turmp announced key US energy players would invest in the local oil infrastructure. Not only that, but the US also gained control over the trade of Venezuelan oil to countries such as Cuba, an important thing to consider given that Latin America is a key destination for US oil exports. Going on a surface-level analysis, it is perfectly in line with the US national security strategy. Yet the implications go beyond merely securing oil reserves or occupying a strategic position in the Caribbean. The attack should be viewed in conjunction with the broader context – and by ‘broader’, we mean both in time and space. Temporally, we need to view it in light of the contrast that the Trump administration wishes to signal compared to previous Democrat administrations. Barack Obama’s administration responded with what was perceived as military restraint to Russia’s aggressive stances, such as when Russia threatened retaliation should the US intervention in Syria in light of Bashar al-Assad’s chemical attacks in Ghouta. Similarly, Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan was heavily criticized, and the withdrawal itself was lambasted for being chaotic and poorly done. Both episodes occurred months before Russian attacks in Ukraine: the invasion of Crimea in spring 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, respectively, and both pairings of events could be interpreted as Russia acting on perceived weakness or hesitation on the United States’ part. The Trump administration, in this context, and particularly given its stated goals and approach, has intended to convey a wholly different message: that it not only can act, but that it will without hesitation. The US attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in summer 2025 and in late February 2026 was as surprising as it was unapologetic. The United States has claimed the Western Hemisphere for its own and wants to demonstrate that it has no qualms or hesitation about trampling international rule of law and traditional diplomatic approaches to enforce this claim. Donald Trump has also made thinly veiled threats that Cuba – a communist-governed country – is next; having already intervened in Venezuela, another state with a strong left-leaning dictatorship, this means the intervention can also be seen as the elimination of the last vestiges of communism and left-leaning authoritarianism in the Western hemisphere.

As for Iran, Donald Trump’s stance towards it has never allowed much room for nuance. In 2018, his administration decided on withdrawing the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the so-called “Iran nuclear deal”, a deal that had been facilitated by China, France, Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States under the Obama administration, an agreement meant to ease sanctions on Iran in exchange for limitations on its nuclear program. From Israel’s point of view, the math is fairly straightforward. A theocratic regime that makes no secret about its contempt towards Israel’s very existence and is also developing nuclear weapons while funding terrorist groups targeting Israel and the Jewish population is a pretty clear and persistent national security threat. Iran made no secret of its praise for Hamas’s attacks on 7 October 2023 where hundreds of civilians in Israel were massacred, while a few hundred more were taken hostage. For the United States, the Republican faction has consistently maintained hardline support for Israel – not only due to religious considerations (what with Israel’s Biblical significance for largely Christian-leaning Republicans), ideological alignment (Benyamin Netanyahu’s own policies and ideologies are comfortably in line with those of the Republican party), but also for its role as a Western-style democracy in a religiously and ideologically complicated landscape, and most crucially, for Israel’s role as a critical ally with considerable military and technological clout in a complicated region, especially as the terrorist threat of Islamic radicalism began to gain more prominence in American political discourse. Iran has also been often called a state sponsor of terrorism, one of the four countries listed as such by the US State Department alongside Syria, Cuba and North Korea. Iran has been called a state sponsor of terrorism even by the socialist parliamentary group in Albania as recently as mid-March 2026. Beyond this, the United States’ relationship with Iran prior to the Islamist revolution was friendly. As mentioned previously, the current Iran leadership has had extremely tense relations with US allies in the region while maintaining friendly ties with China and Russia in what some journalists have dubbed an axis opposing the West in general and the US in particular. The Strait of Hormuz is already known for facilitating about a fifth of global oil and Liquefied Natural Gas trade. Moreover, Iran’s foreign trade is dominated by China, the latter representing over 26% of Iran’s total foreign trade; adding that to China absorbing 90% of Iran’s oil exports, this allows the Beijing powerful leverage over Iran.

Besides its key role in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s geopolitical significance to the US therefore becomes one of creating a US-allied front that can further cement the United States’ weight in the Middle East. The United States would aim to eliminate Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism which threaten the ability of local democracies to develop, to eliminate its support for Houthi rebels in Yemen, increasing a chance for the civil war to end and to gain a US ally overseeing another geopolitical chokepoint – the Bab-el-Mandeb, or “Gate of Tears” that carries significant geoeconomic weight in global maritime trade. By gaining leverage over Iran, the United States accomplishes several geostrategic goals: diminishing sponsorship of terrorism in the region; cementing alliances with major oil states in the region; consolidating American influence in the Strait of Hormuz by creating a “pincer” of US allies dominating it; increase chances for influence over the Bab-el-Mandeb strait; demonstrate the United States’ ability to retaliate against anyone attempting assassination on its key political figures, such as Donald Trump during his 2024 candidacy; gaining control of Iran’s uranium stocks (hence why Russia offered to take it, ostensibly to help quell the current conflict, a proposal rejected by the US); and, last but not least, disrupting the axis consisting of Russia, China and Iran. Whereas Russia and China now hold sway in the region, a US-Israeli victory over Iran would shift the regional balance of power in the United States’ favor and offer it leverage on the international oil markets, particularly by making Iranian oil available for European markets. It is important to note that, while none of the countries in the Gulf are US vassal states and each has their own geopolitical agenda pursuing their own interests, allowing American influence to dominate in the region, especially over the Strait of Hormuz, would force China to double down on its efforts in the South China Sea, yet another highly important strategic point, and this brings us to the crux of the matter: that the US actions in Venezuela and Iran, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s aggressive stance in the South China Sea all stem from the same positional power play.

Positional plays from the great power playbook

The same line of reasoning can be seen now behind the United States’ recent spat and sabre-rattling against Greenland, to very strongly voiced opposition from its European partners. It’s the United States asserting what it perceives to be a legitimate claim over t territory it declares as belonging to it, with President Trump’ statements emphasizing themes of national security in light of its geopolitical rivalry with Russian and China, arguing that the latter two would attempt to occupy Greenland unless the US took it under its control while criticizing its European allies for the latter’s allegedly poor efforts to ensure the island’s security. This follows the United States’ repeated insistence that its NATO allies are not paying their due share with regard to defense spending. The United States, however, do maintain a military presence in Northwestern Greenland and has the power to enforce its presence as it pleases as per existing agreements with Denmark. An interesting thing to consider is that the Trump Administration offered to buy Greenland from Denmark back in 2019 as well, only for its offer to be declined by the Danish government. It is also worth noting that Greenland ranks eighth in the world in terms of rare earth minerals, shortly behind the US, with reserves estimated at 1. 5 million metric tons despite its lack of commercial production. This means Greenland has significant potential as a component in the United States’ key sectors ranging from defense to technology to manufacturing and trade. This makes further sense in light of China’s prominent position as leader in terms of exports and reserves of rare earth minerals, having already proven itself capable of using it as geopolitical leverage as it did during a diplomatic conflict in Japan in 2010. As stated in a previous article, being in a position to influence the production and trade of rare earth minerals is tantamount to being able to influence the rate and speed at which technologies can advance as well as being able to dictate the terms at which this can happen. Rare minerals also play a vital role in developing green energy which can further aid independence from hydrocarbon-based energy, thereby reducing the ability of oil- and gas-rich countries to use it as leverage. This therefore confers onto Greenland a far more significant role than immediate military relevance. Greenland becomes a nexus for securing strategic resources critical for several key sectors outlined in the US national security strategy and leverage against its rivalry against both Russia (reliant on oil exports) and China (global hegemon in reserves and exports of rare earths).

To complete the picture, we need to look at China’s gradually increasing aggression against Taiwan. A 2024 analysis shows that China has carried out tests for potential tactics to invade Taiwan, amping up its military capabilities on all fronts – including space, cyberwarfare and nuclear armament – would enable it to defeat Taiwan by 2027 as per Xi Jinping’s directive. The same analysis cites a Pentagon report warning that, despite President Trump’s pledge to improve relations with China, this military buildup presents a threat to American homeland security. One major recent development occurred in early 2026 when it was found that China was flying military drones that masked their identities to signal receivers, passing off as different kinds of aircraft while surveying the South China Sea, a move analysts have interpreted as a possible indication of China testing tactics. The buildup has reached the point where in early 2026, Japan announced that it would deploy missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan within the next five years, a decision preceded by statements made in November by Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, regarding a possible change in Japan’s stance towards Taiwan, departing from its historical ambiguity to more proactive military involvement; Japan’s decision drew immediate diplomatic retaliation from China who discouraged its citizens from visiting Japan, condemned Japan for its refusal to own up to its actions during World War II, and interestingly enough, instated harsher controls on its exports of rare earth mineral exports to Japan. Interestingly, the US approached Venezuela with the mindset of a chess player – capture the king to win the match. China, on the other hand, approaches Taiwan with the mindset of a go player: slowly surrounding it and cutting off its options until surrender is the only option left, a strategy reflected in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War where surrounding an enemy is the suggested course of action when one possesses superior forces. Regardless of whether we view the events through the lens of chess or go, there is a certain pattern to the ongoing events in Latin America, the Middle East, Ukraine and the South China Sea.

The United States’ actions towards Iran, Venezuela and Greenland may seem disconnected from Russia’s attack on Ukraine or China’s slow encroachment upon Taiwan’s autonomy, but they ultimately all follow a remarkably similar pattern. In all cases, we see major powers direct their aggression towards what was perceived to be a significantly inferior power within its sphere of influence in order to consolidate control over key strategic points under the guise of political and moral legitimacy or national security reasons. In less refined terms, we’re witnessing not just land grabs. We’re witnessing a military appropriation and reinforcement of dominion over spheres of influence beyond trade relations, arms deals, diplomacy or involvement in proxy wars. Russia was doing this in Ukraine to gain a foothold in Ukraine’s energy-rich regions and, through it, also gain a foothold in NATO’s eastern flank. China was already gradually escalating its presence in the South China Sea. The United States seemed determined to take a more reactive position when it came to military interventions abroad following the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan; it sent warships to patrol the South China Sea (ostensibly to ensure freedom of navigation) to counterweigh China’s presence in the region, it launched its hit against Iran in 2025 when Israel attacked the latter in mid-June, and when it came to Ukraine, the US limited itself to sending military aid. The novelty is the United States deciding to use its military capabilities to flex its muscles and enforce control over the Western Hemisphere it reclaimed for itself in the national security document. What is significant to note is that their respective self-assigned spheres of influence are the only areas where the US, Russia and China have pushed forth a military presence themselves. Rather than use proxies as they tend to in other regions, the US, Russia and China are only active militarily under their own respective flags in these three regions: Venezuela (in the Western Hemisphere, reclaimed by the US), Ukraine (historically part of the Kievan Rus', now a buffer zone between Russia and NATO), and Taiwan (whose independence and separation from China is contested by the latter). And all three powers have employed justifications pertaining to national security or territorial reclamation: narcoterrorism in the case of Venezuela; Ukraine was accused of harbouring hostile intentions towards Russia (in addition to the latter’s claims of Ukraine being governed by Nazis), and Taiwan’s statehood being denied as part of Beijing’s “One China” policy wherein Taiwan is deemed an inextricable part of China’s territory. Three major powers engaging militarily in three regions within areas they claim as their own, using the exact same formula.

The Persian Pivot?

Over the past nearly two months, Iran has become the global geopolitical and geoeconomic centre of gravity. There are a number of ways in which the conflict can be resolved (or remain unresolved). The grimmest and darkest, of course, are escalation to full-on war, boots on the ground and the whole nine yards, in which case the United States may risk finding itself in a situation worse than Iraq and more akin to Vietnam, especially if none of the NATO allies intervene, for it is almost certain that Iran would receive support and become a proxy for Russia and China. Should the latter join US efforts, the situation shall become far more complicated as neither Russia nor China will stand aside. Terrorist attacks on the territory of NATO countries will most certainly be used as a tactic to use deliberate civilian casualties as a deterrent. A less militarily-inclined is the situation in which the US keeps Iran, China and Russia in a sort of geopolitical check, where neither side concedes territory but settles in a sort of uncomfortable, tense equilibrium – enough to allow the global economy to adapt to the new reality, not enough for any party to tip the balance of power in the region to anyone’s scale. It is also possible that negotiations could lead to a mutual compromise that both the US and Iran will most certainly parade as a victory over the other. Thirdly, a US withdrawal and a return to the status quo would almost certainly be interpreted as a defeat for the US, a failure not unlike Afghanistan in the wake of the 2021 retreat (which concluded with the country being handed back to the Taliban i.e. the very faction the 2001 invasion was meant to oust as a way of curtailing terrorist activity). One could make the improbable case that the US used the Iranian conflict to map out its own strength and weaknesses (such that the defeat is merely a strategic retreat to remedy its own shortcomings), but this would spell political suicide for the current Republican Administration. Lastly, the outcome is that the US gains a significant victory over Iran. Such an outcome would still mean that the United States’ military weaknesses and limitations would be revealed to its adversaries, which would warrant immediate strategic reassessment and recalibration.

Whether it gains the upper hand militarily or diplomatically, a US victory would tip the balance of power in the region. A change to Iran’s regime that is more amenable to cooperating with the US or the West in general would prove a major strategic asset in the Middle East. Whatever the outcome, the absence of a significant change in the mindset of Iran’s government will ensure that sponsorship of terrorist cells will continue, even if links to Tehran will be subdued. Whatever the outcome, it shouldn’t surprise anyone if the US midterms would reflect the American population’s disapproval for the heretofore performance of the current administration. Although the United States’ actions are in line with what it set out to do in its National Security Strategy, they violate part of the promises that had brought Donald Trump back in office in 2024: to focus on domestic American issues as opposed to American involvement in foreign conflicts. In all cases, the resolution of the war against Iran will alter the fate of the global balance of power, be it in subtle or overt ways. A frozen conflict creating a new equilibrium will lead to an uncomfortable tension between the US and Israel on the one hand, and Iran on the other, with both sides biding their time to gain the upper hand over the other in the future. An Iran victory would lead to a loss of credibility of the United States’ ability to project military power beyond its hemisphere, but it would also reveal crucial faults in the functioning of its intelligence apparatus and operational capacity that the US must address. A US victory would determine China and Russia to recalibrate and tip the balance of power in the region. Iran’s victory hinges on its ability to outlast the US militarily, while the latter’s resolve to fight is eroded due to mounting economic hardship and internal political dissatisfaction. The US and Israel’s victory hinge on their ability to control key points to cancel out Iran’s defensive abilities and economic leverage but more importantly, on the ability to bring about a change in the current leadership, yet this would require the elimination of the IRGC, which can only be done not solely through the elimination of key figures. It would require leveraging any existing internal fault lines within Iranian politics; there’s also always the chance that, should the IRGC be eliminated, it may instead be replaced with something even worse. In all cases Iran has become the unspoken Persian Pivot on which the future global power architecture hinge.

Photo source: PxHere.com.