TheMarketForIdeas

The words “technocrat” and “technocracy” have recently returned to public discourse in Romania. It appears that they were coined in 1919 by the American engineer W. H. Smith to designate a mode of economic organisation inspired by the rational principles of the natural sciences. The appeal of this current of thought was amplified by the disastrous effects of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Today, governments composed of technocrats are often regarded as viable solutions in times of crisis or when political leaders prove timid, indecisive, or discredited.

The technocratic ideal

By emphasising the need for the scientific organisation of socio-economic life and the importance of specialists, the doctrine of technocracy reflects a permanent tendency in social and political thought. This orientation is illustrated by Plato, who imagined an ideal state governed by philosophers; by Saint-Simon, who described in detail a perfect society administered by scientists; and by the classical authors of Marxism-Leninism (Marx, Engels, Lenin), who sought nothing less than the scientific creation of a new humanity.

The explanation for this enduring temptation lies in the fact that the doctrine of technocracy is based on the cult of efficiency, which reflects mankind’s eternal desire to achieve the greatest possible results with the least possible effort. This aspiration, most often accompanied by reservations regarding traditional political institutions, implies great confidence in the possibility of solving social problems rationally. It frequently, though not necessarily, leads to the idea of entrusting decisions concerning public affairs to technical experts.

Part of the attractiveness of the doctrine of technocracy derives from the elasticity of the term itself. According to dictionaries, technocracy is a system of government in which decision-makers are technicians, especially scientists and experts in various fields. This definition, however, raises a number of questions: does the label “technocrat” apply to any expert involved in state administration or only to one operating outside the political sphere? How many technocrats must there be in a government, and which positions must they occupy, for that government to be called “technocratic”? Does such a government operate within the existing political system or replace it? If so, for how long? Can a technocrat become a politician and vice versa? The answers to these questions are usually diverse and ambiguous.

Moreover, because it bears similarities to terms such as “theocracy” (government by divinity or its earthly representatives), “autocracy” (government by a single person), and “bureaucracy” (government by specialised individuals operating within a hierarchical structure with strictly defined responsibilities and procedures), technocratism appeals to all those exasperated by the perceived “inefficiency” of democracy (government by the people).

Technocracy and modern democracies

The so-called “Western” political societies – that is, in reality, capitalist industrial societies in which the ultimate source of political legitimacy is the outcome of elections – currently find themselves in an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, these societies claim to govern themselves through various forms of representative democracy, involving a certain degree of public control over political life by citizens or at least by their representatives. On the other hand, several aspects of their functioning tend to diverge significantly from this model. One of the factors behind these deviations is the existence of situations in which the determining forces are economic powers (particularly industrial and financial), which thereby acquire the possibility of influencing state authorities according to their own interests. The existence of private economic power at key points of social and political life therefore constitutes a serious obstacle to the application of democratic principles of government.

Another feature of contemporary Western societies – closely connected to the previous one – is the influence exerted on politics by technicians who are not politically accountable. One example is that of central bank governors, who nowadays generally enjoy legal independence from government. Another example is that of judges, whose rulings can lead to the dismissal of public officials, the invalidation of elections, increases in public expenditure, and so forth. In such cases, relying on certain forms of expertise, which are not always beyond dispute, and guided by what they consider to be the “general interest” – or rather by the particular interests of certain social groups or economic sectors – technocrats end up imposing their views and decisions on elected representatives. Thus, politicians become, in certain situations, mere executors of the technicians’ will. In other words, the actual functioning of the democratic political system involves the transfer of certain decisions into the hands of technicians, who thereby acquire powers of their own. These powers make them independent both of governments and of the wider public. One may therefore say that those who ultimately govern are not the leaders elected by the people but these “grey eminences.”

Finally, even governments enjoying parliamentary majorities and formed by a single party, a coalition of parties, or even just two parties (as in the United States) often find it difficult to adopt certain complex decisions, such as those concerning military operations, changes in electoral rules, tax increases, or reductions in public spending. For this reason, governments frequently create specialised agencies to deal with such matters (health, education, the environment, and so forth), staffing them with experts who thereby acquire prestige and influence.

Despite this, governments formed wholly or partially according to technocratic criteria remain exceptions in contemporary Western-style democracies: Hungary (2009-2010), the Czech Republic (2009-2010), Italy (2011-2013), Greece (2011-2012), and Romania (2015-2017). As already noted, this solution is adopted in special circumstances, and such technocratic governments are appointed for a limited period and with a specific mandate. Thus, according to the statements of the politicians involved, the principal objective of the technocratic government currently being formed in Romania is to overcome the major political deadlock created by the dismissal of the Bolojan government and to stabilise the country’s economy and public finances.

Technocracy and totalitarianism

Technocracy was one of the myths of communism: according to the classical authors of Marxism-Leninism, after the proletariat conquered power, government would pass into the hands of administrators. Although this prediction was never fulfilled anywhere, “real existing” communism demonstrated that technocracy and totalitarianism are closely linked. When political power cannot be publicly challenged, elections become irrelevant, and a certain qualification – whether genuine or merely formal – can provide an advantage to individuals seeking advancement within the structures of power.

In Romania, communist leaders generally had little formal education. After coming to power, however, many of them became “specialists,” “engineers,” “academicians,” and even “world-renowned scientists” (a famous case because of its sheer absurdity).

As Professor Lucian Boia points out (The Scientific Mythology of Communism, Humanitas, 2011, pp. 42-44), “of all the myths assembled within communist mythology, none enjoyed greater prestige than the myth of the engineer. He embodied the ideal image of the new man, indeed of the new man in general, for this new man was also expected to be an intellectual” (p. 148).

The explanation lies, first of all, in the fact that the profession of engineer appeared to unite physical and intellectual labour, a defining characteristic of the new man. Secondly, the importance of the engineer was imposed by the programme of building communism, conceived as a strictly scientific undertaking and situated at the very core of communist mythology (pp. 148-151).

Viewed retrospectively, the communist experiment demonstrates as clearly as possible that technocracy, when not subject to political control by society or its elected representatives, offers no guarantee that its ideas and decisions will be sound. Convincing evidence can be found in the gigantic construction projects undertaken in various communist countries – from the White Sea-Baltic Canal in the Soviet Union, to the development of the Yellow River basin in China, and the Danube-Black Sea Canal in Romania.

Built by communist regimes at enormous material cost and with immense human sacrifice, these pharaonic projects often proved economically useless or inefficient and environmentally disastrous. Yet because, until the fall of communism, the leaderships of communist parties and states could not be held accountable, responsibility was frequently shifted onto technicians, who were accused of sabotage and sentenced to death or long prison terms.

Communists were not the only believers in technocracy. In dysfunctional states, military leaders who seize power through coups often employ technocratic language in order to demonstrate that they are independent of political parties and concerned solely with the “national interest.” Likewise, military juntas frequently include civilian technocrats in government or leave power in their hands when the military itself withdraws from direct rule.

The result is usually a technocratic-military hybrid in which civilian experts control economic and social portfolios while military officers retain the ministries of defence and internal affairs. This model can be observed, for example, in present-day Egypt, whose regime may be described as a military-bureaucratic autocracy.

Probably the most successful case of technocracy is Singapore, where the political and technical components of government appear to have fused completely. Second place, from the standpoint of socio-economic performance, belongs to the former British colony of Hong Kong (returned to Beijing in 1997).

Finally, the government formed by Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) – described by Nobel Prize laureate Mario Vargas Llosa as “the perfect dictatorship” – evolved from revolutionary generals to lawyer-politicians and eventually to economist-technocrats, although with less success than the Southeast Asian cases mentioned above.

Technocrats and politics

In reality, even a government composed entirely of technocrats operates under strong political influence. In countries with defective democracies or hybrid regimes, powerful interest groups exist alongside numerous conflicts and tensions. Technocrats, like politicians, must submit to cross-party majorities and navigate the intrigues that characterise elected assemblies.

They must also confront the people themselves – a confrontation that can at times be extremely harsh, particularly when the population is divided along ethnic, religious, geographic, or other lines, or when citizens perceive technocrats as biased in distributing benefits and allocating sacrifices.

In this context, it is interesting to recall the experience of certain world-famous economists – some Nobel Prize winners with outstanding academic achievements – who advised countries facing external debt crises and recommended various reforms and fiscal adjustments. The decision to reduce certain public expenditures or increase particular taxes, however, requires not only scientific and technical expertise but also acute political judgment.

Few technocrats possess this gift, and acquiring it through experience can be a lengthy, costly, and sometimes politically fatal process.

The experience of dysfunctional states shows that, in order to overcome such obstacles, the head of a technocratic government must possess certain personal qualities enabling him or her to adopt – or induce – important decisions even without a formal electoral mandate.

One factor that may facilitate this process is the existence of external constraints widely recognised by the population and accepted by at least some political forces. Such a constraint may arise, for example, from the objective of joining an international organisation. Several former communist countries resorted to technocratic governments in order to implement reforms necessary for accession to the European Union.

A similar role may be played by the conditions attached to an IMF agreement concluded in order to avert the danger of sovereign default. In the absence of such “anchors,” domestic political forces – often a monarch, a president, or a populist parliament – may dismiss a technocratic government once it becomes inconvenient.

The limits of depoliticisation

The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that government by technocrats does not, contrary to superficial claims, eliminate politics from public affairs. The desire to replace politics with technique, the aspiration to “depoliticise” the great issues of social life, enjoys considerable popularity throughout the world today.

Yet so long as the social and cultural cleavages that divide human beings continue to exist, replacing the government of people with the administration of things – as communist theorists, especially Engels and Lenin, believed – remains impossible.

The transformation of government into administration is therefore utopian.

As for the claim by authorities that this ambition has already been achieved, it is in reality little more than a governing tactic. In practice, strengthening the power of technocrats ultimately means granting the power to formulate and implement national policy to technicians who are not accountable to citizens.

Although political authority remains formally intact, it is partially emptied of substance. And this is already the case, to a considerable extent, in several fields, including economic policy.

Technocrats, public administration, and democratic control

In economic matters, the growing role of technocrats is most visible in central banking and financial regulation. Over recent decades, many countries have granted central banks a high degree of independence, arguing that monetary policy should be protected from electoral cycles and short-term political pressures. The underlying rationale is that specialists are better equipped than politicians to maintain price stability and safeguard the long-term interests of the economy.

This reasoning is not without merit. However, it raises a fundamental question: who ultimately decides what constitutes the public interest? Economic policy is never merely technical. Decisions concerning inflation, unemployment, taxation, public spending, or public debt invariably affect different social groups in different ways. Consequently, such decisions contain not only technical elements but also value judgments.

For this reason, even when policies are formulated by experts, their objectives and broader implications remain political. The idea that economic management can be entirely separated from politics is therefore misleading. Technocrats may determine the most efficient means of achieving a particular objective, but they cannot legitimately decide on the objective itself without entering the realm of politics.

This issue becomes even more evident when considering the role of international institutions. Organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Commission, or the European Central Bank rely heavily on expert knowledge and technical analysis. Yet the recommendations they formulate often involve choices with significant social and political consequences.

In many cases, these institutions have been criticised for promoting policies that, while economically coherent according to certain theoretical frameworks, generated substantial social costs. The debate surrounding austerity programmes implemented after the global financial crisis illustrates precisely this tension between technical expertise and democratic legitimacy.

The increasing complexity of modern societies undoubtedly requires specialised knowledge. Contemporary governments must deal with issues that demand highly sophisticated expertise: digitalisation, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate change, energy systems, public health, financial markets, and many others.

No democratic government can function effectively without specialists. The problem arises when expertise is transformed into a source of political authority independent of democratic accountability.

In such circumstances, technocracy risks evolving into a form of government exercised by a relatively small group of experts whose legitimacy derives not from electoral support but from their presumed competence. The danger is not necessarily that these experts act in bad faith. Rather, it is that they may become insulated from public scrutiny and increasingly detached from the concerns of ordinary citizens.

This phenomenon recalls the concept of the “power elite” developed by the American sociologist C. Wright Mills. According to this perspective, modern societies are often governed not by the public at large but by interconnected networks of political, economic, military, and administrative elites. Technocrats can become part of such networks, contributing to the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of relatively small groups.

From this perspective, technocracy should not be understood as the opposite of politics but rather as one of its contemporary forms. The struggle over public decisions does not disappear when experts replace politicians; it merely shifts to different arenas and adopts different forms.

The essential challenge, therefore, is not to eliminate politics but to ensure that expertise remains compatible with democratic control. Specialists are indispensable, but their role should be advisory and executive rather than sovereign. Democratic legitimacy ultimately requires that major collective choices remain subject to public debate and political accountability.

Conclusion

The doctrine of technocracy reflects a legitimate aspiration: the desire to improve public decision-making through knowledge, competence, and rational analysis. Throughout history, however, attempts to elevate expertise above politics have repeatedly encountered serious limitations.

Neither technicians nor politicians possess a monopoly on wisdom. Technical expertise is essential for understanding complex realities and identifying feasible solutions, but it cannot replace the process through which societies determine their collective goals.

For this reason, the relationship between technocracy and democracy should not be viewed as a choice between opposites. Modern societies need both democratic legitimacy and technical competence. The challenge lies in maintaining an appropriate balance between them.

Whenever this balance is lost – whether through the domination of politics over expertise or through the domination of expertise over politics – the quality of governance inevitably suffers.

Ultimately, the most effective governments are not those that eliminate politics in favour of technocracy, nor those that disregard expertise in favour of political expediency. Rather, they are those capable of combining democratic accountability with professional competence, ensuring that technical knowledge serves society without replacing society’s right to govern itself.

Photo source: [1] Daniel Nouri @ pexels.com; [2] Kemal Can @ pexels.com.