TheMarketForIdeas

Introduction

The Nile River has long been governed more by politics than hydrology, with its control imposed by foreign powers, not equity. The Nile Water Agreements, signed in 1929 and 1959, were negotiated by colonial powers who deliberately excluded upstream-state Ethiopia, giving Egypt control over 66% of its waters and effective veto power over upstream development.[1] On the contrary, Ethiopia, whose highlands supply approximately 85% of the Nile’s volume, has been relegated to the margins of a system designed to entrench dominance, not foster shared control.[2] Now, after decades of foreign monopoly, Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has shattered the status quo, a move viewed by Egypt and Sudan as destabilizing, though long seen by Ethiopia as a necessary correction to decades of imposed marginalization.

In July 2021, Ethiopia unilaterally filled the dam, marking a critical turn in a decade-long conflict.[3] In spite of years of negotiation attempts, Ethiopia proceeded to fill the GERD for a second year without an agreement, prompting Cairo to accuse it of jeopardizing peace and water security.[4]

This article argues that the GERD conflict exposes how historic entitlements are no longer viable for managing transboundary water disputes and why equitable-use frameworks must be implemented if water security and political stability are to endure. Egypt’s existential fears are understandable, but they cannot infinitely justify the perpetuation of legal arrangements created from colonial expedience rather than negotiated consent.[5] The GERD is not merely an infrastructural project, but a strategic assertion of Ethiopian authority, a calculated dismantling of the view that a single nation may forever control one of North Africa’s greatest water resources.

Background & context

The Nile River, stretching over 6,600 kilometers, is the lifeline of eleven countries. Yet, its governance has long been dictated by downstream hegemony, particularly by Egypt, which has historically asserted control over the river’s flow through colonial-era agreements. The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the subsequent 1959 Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and Sudan allocated the entirety of the Nile’s waters between these two nations, granting Egypt 55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters annually.[6] Conspicuously, these treaties excluded upstream countries like Ethiopia, despite the fact that its highlands contribute approximately 85% of the Nile’s flow via the Blue Nile.[7]

Ethiopia’s exclusion from formal water-sharing agreements has long undermined its development goals and reinforced an asymmetric power dynamic in the basin. For decades, Egypt maintained its hydro-hegemonic posture, leveraging diplomatic, economic and even military influence to prevent upstream development.[8] This dynamic fostered a zero-sum mentality, where upstream utilization is seen as a direct threat to downstream survival.[9]

The construction of the GERD marked a deliberate and disruptive challenge to this archaic order. Initiated in 2011, GERD is Africa’s largest hydroelectric project, designed to generate over 6,000 megawatts of electricity and provide power to millions of Ethiopians and neighboring states. While Ethiopia has framed it as a sovereign project and mobilized significant domestic funding through public bonds and internal contributions, this portrayal obscures the essential role of GERD’s main foreign partner: China. Chinese state-linked institutions provide more than $1 billion in loans for procurement of turbines and electromechanical equipment, as well as additional funding for the 500kV transmission infrastructure necessary for distributing the dam’s electricity.[10]

In contrast, Egypt has perceived the dam as a national security threat. The country is fully dependent on the Nile, with 90% of its freshwater supply being extracted from the river. Cairo officials have warned that unilateral upstream action, especially during drought periods, could have catastrophic consequences.[11] As a safety net, Egypt has demanded a legally binding agreement regulating the filling and operation of the dam. Conversely, Ethiopia, citing sovereignty and the principle of rational and equitable use, has strongly rejected any framework that would limit its autonomy over its own dam.[12]

Sudan, geographically and politically wedged between the two, has shifted its position on the issue a multitude of times. Despite the fact that Sudan stands to actually gain significant benefits from the GERD, such as regulated flows and hydropower imports, it has nonetheless raised some important issues, citing dam safety, potential flooding and the absence of a comprehensive risk mitigation system. Khartoum’s oscillation has added further strain on an already volatile negotiating environment.[13]

A number of countries and institutions, such as the United States and the African Union, have attempted to mediate negotiations, to no avail. Talks remain stalled and unilateral actions from all three sides continue to shape this “cold” conflict’s trajectory. As of 2025, the dam is partially filled and operational, while the legal framework around it remains conspicuously absent.

Policy failures and GERD mechanics

In spite of decades of institutional optimism, the governance structures surrounding the Nile Basin have consistently failed to ameliorate the conflict over the Ethiopian Dam. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), backed by the World Bank and established in 1999, was intended to foster cooperation among the Nile-bordering nations. However, in practice, it remains a weak forum for dialogue, with no enforcement authority or legal binding. Egypt has treated the NBI as mostly symbolic, while Ethiopia has grown increasingly skeptical of its capacity to challenge systemic downstream dominance.[14]

The 2015 Declaration of Principles (DoP) was signed by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough. In reality, the agreement provided vague legal frameworks, without defining what terms such as “collaboration” and “equitable use meant”. Its ambiguity was perfect grounds for discord: Egypt interpreted it as implying mandatory consultation before dam filling; Ethiopia countered that it preserved their right to operate GERD autonomously. The result was a veritable legal Rorschach test, in which every party saw validation and neither was constrained.[15]

From Egypt’s perspective, the demand for a legally binding agreement is not merely about upkeeping its colonial privileges, but about safeguarding national survival under extreme hydrological vulnerability. 90% of the country’s freshwater supply is dependent on the Nile and limited rainfall and Cairo argues that upstream actions could cause irreversible damage to its agricultural and public health sectors.[16] Egypt insists that only a binding drought management protocol can prevent catastrophic outcomes.[17] While these concerns are understandable, the insistence on historical allocations fails to accommodate developmental needs and modern, legal rights. Cooperative mechanisms must balance risk-sharing and equitable use in order to adapt to growing climate stressors.[18]

At the core of the conflict lies a profound legal incompatibility. Egypt invokes its rights over the Nile based on the 1929 and 1959 agreements. Ethiopia rejects them these agreements as colonial relics and appeals to the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which emphasizes equitable and reasonable use. Ethiopia signed this convention, but Egypt has not. The schism between the two countries is not just theoretical, but political. One side clings to archaic terms that favor it, while the other seeks to break free from them.[19]

Structural lessons from the GERD conflict

The GERD conflict is not an isolated incident. It is a revealing case of how water disputes unravel under the combined pressure of legal ambiguity, power asymmetry and institutional fragility. While the Nile Basin has its own unique historical and geopolitical features, the structural dynamics that have undermined cooperation in this case mirror conflicts playing out all around the world: from the Mekong and the Indus to the Tigris-Euphrates and the Jordan River systems.[20]

Power asymmetry is the leitmotif of most water disputes. In the Nile Basin, Egypt has long enjoyed diplomatic and legal dominance, while Ethiopia has lacked institutional recognition of upstream contribution. GERD is the manifestation of infrastructure as leverage. Similar strategies have played out in the Tigris-Euphrates, where Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia Project shifted basin control.[21]

Legal frameworks further compound these tensions. International water law is riddled with inconsistencies, and this is best highlighted in the Cairo vs. Addis Ababa conflict. Egypt invokes “historic rights”; Ethiopia denounces them as colonial terms and appeals to the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention.[22] The problem is not that the law is necessarily weak, but that it is divisive and can be exploited to form such political rifts.

Lastly, the politicization of water renders compromise toxic. In Ethiopia, GERD is a symbol of post-colonial agency. In Egypt, the Nile represents state survival. When infrastructure become identity, disputes turn into ideological conflicts. This phenomenon occurs everywhere: the Indus River Treaty survived between India and Pakistan only because of extreme diplomatic insulation, while conflicts over the Jordan River remain frozen in nationalist narratives.[23] GERD is a stark reminder that the future of water cooperation is dependent not only on better treaties, but on the de-escalation of symbolic politics. This conflict is a clear warning to all international water stakeholders that technical water-sharing agreements alone are insufficient. Multilateralism will continue to fail regions all around the globe, if structural reforms are not clearly drafted and implemented to address power asymmetries and entitlement.

Conclusions

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is a strong illustrator of how colonial legacies, power imbalances and shifting dynamics contribute to the formation of paralyzing conflicts in the absence of institutional trust. The path forward lies not in reinventing treaties, but in rethinking national incentives and negotiation structures.

From a water security point of view, GERD showcases the urgent need for third-party, regulatory institutions that are regionally credible, financially independent and politically removed from any historic colonial influence. This could take the form of an African Union-led commission specifically tasked with the waters belonging to member states or a Nile River Fund, accessible to all Nile-adjacent countries that can disburse infrastructure funds based on cooperation benchmarks.

Additionally, water diplomacy must be implemented alongside energy access, agricultural strategies and climate adaptation efforts. Future rounds of negotiations should highlight communal gains that arise from regional cooperation rather than re-hashing historical rights. Reframing the dam on the international stage as a beacon of growth and collaboration, as opposed to a national victory, can help overcome aggressive nationalist sentiments.

To conclude, GERD is far more than just a hydrological structure: it is a test for the viability of post-colonial resource governance. If parties continue to pursue legacy claims, the outcome is likely to be stalemate at best, economic and military crisis at worst. If basin countries can shift towards mutual benefit frameworks, then even controversial projects like GERD can become catalysts for change and integration.

Notes:

[1] Yihdego Z. et al. (2017), The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Nile Basin: Implications for Transboundary Water Cooperation, Abingdon, UK: Routledge; Salman, S.M.A. (2016), “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The Road to the Declaration of Principles and the Khartoum Document,” Water International 41, no. 4: 512-527.

[2] Swain, A. (2011), “Challenges for Water Sharing in the Nile Basin: Changing Geo-Politics and Changing Climate,” Hydrological Sciences Journal 56, no. 4: 687-702.

[3] Al Jazeera (2021), “Egypt, Sudan slam Ethiopia as it begins second filling of Nile dam”, July 5.

[4] United Nations (2021), “Security Council Briefed on Nile Dam Dispute as Egypt, Sudan Call for Legally Binding Agreement”, July 8.

[5] Salman, S.M.A. (2016), “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The Road to the Declaration of Principles and the Khartoum Document,” Water International 41, no. 4: 512-527.

[6] International Crisis Group (2020), “Bridging the gap in the Nile dispute,” March 19.

[7] Fahmy, N. (2021), “The water crisis in Egypt and the reasons behind it,” World Economic Forum.

[8] Yacob-Haliso, O., & Dahan, M. (2023), “Hydro-hegemony and the geopolitics of the Nile,” Nile Basin Policy Review, 14(2), 87-102.

[9] Hassanein, A. (2023), “The Nile dispute: Beyond water security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[10] AidData. (2020), “China funds power transmission for GERD”; Brookings Institution. (2020). “The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”

[11] Fahmy, N. (2021), “The water crisis in Egypt and the reasons behind it,” World Economic Forum.

[12] Climate Diplomacy (2023), “The politics of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”

[13] International Crisis Group (2020), “Bridging the gap in the Nile dispute,” March 19.

[14] Mekonnen, D.Z. (2021), “The Nile Basin cooperative framework agreement and the GERD negotiations: An appraisal of international water law,” African Human Rights Law Journal, 21(2), 448-470.

[15] International Crisis Group (2020), “Bridging the gap in the Nile dispute,” March 19.

[16] Abdelrahman H. (2023), “The Nile Dispute: Beyond Water Security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 11.

[17] United Nations (2021), “Security Council Briefed on Nile Dam Dispute as Egypt, Sudan Call for Legally Binding Agreement”, July 8.

[18] International Crisis Group (2020), “Bridging the gap in the Nile dispute,” March 19.

[19] Mekonnen, D.Z. (2021), “The Nile Basin cooperative framework agreement and the GERD negotiations: An appraisal of international water law,” African Human Rights Law Journal, 21(2), 448-470.; Zeitoun, M., & Warner, J. (2006), “Hydro-hegemony: A framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts,” Water Policy, 8(5), 435-460.

[20] Pohl, B., Kramer, A., Hull, W., Blumstein, S., & Michel, D. (2014), “The rise of hydro-diplomacy: Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters,” Adelphi.

[21] Zeitoun, M., & Warner, J. (2006), “Hydro-hegemony: A framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts,” Water Policy, 8(5), 435-460.

[22] UN (1997), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.

[23] Gleick, P.H. (2014), “The world's water volume 8: The biennial report on freshwater resources,” Island Press.