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The MERCOSURrealism of Europe

The MERCOSURrealism of Europe A Restful Perspective

Latin America has a complicated relationship with freedom, perhaps also because it has had to win it more than once, and in more than one sense. Libertadores such as Bolívar and San Martín freed much of the continent from European empires, but political independence did not, by simply severing the colonial umbilical cord, untie the economic, social, and institutional knots left behind. There followed republics to invent, borders to defend, nations to build, and economies that continued to ship towards the old centres what geography had bestowed upon them most generously: food, metals, energy. South America was thus politically liberated before becoming economically enlightened. Two centuries later, the question is no longer who rules over it, but in how many ways it can depend on others without ceasing to be its own master. If the liberators triumphed in the wars of independence, their successors awoke to a less heroic mission: the management of freedom.

And manage it they did, not least through integration, with the Latin American passion for continental projects that reality has periodically brought back down to earth. LAFTA, later LAIA, the Andean Pact, subsequently transformed into the Andean Community, and other arrangements sought to turn geographical proximity into a market and economic power. MERCOSUR, born in 1991 under the Treaty of Asunción, proved one of the hardier offspring of this large family. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay envisaged a common market, free movement, a common external tariff, and a common trade policy. The promise has remained grander than the achievement: the customs union retains exceptions, while national politics does not always submit to regional discipline. Nevertheless, MERCOSUR has survived crises and political swings. For a continent rich in integration projects launched in capital letters and continued in footnotes, that is no small accomplishment.

Meanwhile, Europe has rediscovered (South) America. The caravels no longer arrive, which is reassuring; negotiation chapters do, and they sometimes stir up the waters. The old conquistador metropolises have returned, but instead of drawing meridians, as at Tordesillas, they now draw up tariff quotas, rules of origin, sanitary standards, geographical indications, and environmental regulations. The comparison only goes so far: Brussels is no imperial Madrid or Lisbon; instead of conquering armies, it wields the acquis communautaire. Yet the irony still holds, for two centuries after emancipation from European empires, América del Sud / do Sul is negotiating with Europe’s most elaborate edifice of integration a different kind of in-/inter-/dependence. Not without its tantrums. For the groupings on the two continents have different temperaments: MERCOSUR, more intergovernmental in character, preserves the discretion of national executives, whereas the EU favours institutions, rules, and standards.

Except that Europe, which negotiates as one, does not necessarily think as one. The agreement has superimposed upon the geography of the Atlantic an internal geography of interests: industrial economies eager for access to South American markets, agricultural sectors fearful of competition, and governments obliged to reconcile European trade strategy with national electoral sensitivities. The friction is interinstitutional, too. On 21 January 2026, the European Parliament voted, by 334 votes to 324, with 11 abstentions, to request an opinion from the Court of Justice of the European Union on the compatibility of the EMPA/iTA agreements and their conclusion procedure with the EU Treaties, putting its consent process on hold pending the Court’s opinion. Meanwhile, the Interim Trade Agreement has been provisionally applied since 1 May. Thus, EU–MERCOSUR is commercially operational while remaining legally and politically contested: an almost Hegelian predicament for a Union accustomed to producing syntheses out of theses and antitheses.

Seen from South America, the spectacle may be read in reverse: who, or what, is really the prize for whom? For Brussels, closer ties with MERCOSUR mean markets, resources, and diversified relationships; Washington has explicitly reaffirmed, through the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, its interest in hemispheric pre-eminence; China has established its own gravitational pull through trade, investment, lending, and infrastructure; Russia, economically far more modest by comparison, nevertheless maintains relationships and strategic niches. MERCOSUR may thus become the trophy in a contest among powers. More subtly, however, it may also become its arbiter: the actor capable of turning a plurality of suitors into bargaining room. After two centuries in which some forced their way in, economic diplomacy is now trying to win its way into favour. Yet the freedom to arbitrate exists only as long as the alternatives are genuine and MERCOSUR’s members can play among them without ending up being played against one another.

Which brings us to ourselves, the Latins of the Danube. Romania may gaze affectionately upon its linguistic cousins across the Atlantic until beef, poultry, sugar, ethanol, and other products entirely devoid of philological sentiment enter the picture. As the saying might go, brothers will be brothers (in Latin blood, no less!), but cheese – and especially meat – is strictly business (pardon the expression!). Agriculture remains one of the EU’s sore spots, just as access to South American markets offers opportunities to European exporters, Romanians included. Neither an agricultural Apocalypse nor a commercial El Dorado, however, qualifies as economic analysis, which ought to rest on rational arguments alone. Such matters involve the stomach, that ultimate seat of human reasoning. Still, a tariff preference is merely an open door, not someone pushing us through it. Perhaps this is also the moral of Europe’s MERCOSURrealism: in an interconnected global economy, freedom does not mean depending on nobody, but having enough options to be at nobody’s mercy.

 
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