
The Mirage of the New American Expansionism Geopolitical Shopping Mall [I]
Donald Trump has spent the last weeks before the start of his new term as US President throwing populist proposals left and right related to renaming landforms, annexing Canada, America’s ownership of the Panama Canal, and annexing Greenland. I would add to this populist trend the unrealistic proposal for NATO members to allocate 5% of GDP to defense, which serves as a bargaining chip for an acceptable level. This article aims to analyze the proposal for Panama and Greenland and to emphasize that, regardless of how realistic the non-violent and unforced annexation of these territories is, Americans have a complex strategic and historical perspective on these regions. This is not another Trump idiosyncrasy, but another case of Trump saying out loud what a faction of the American elites is thinking. The annexation of Canada does not seem credible to me in terms of the costs it would entail and the impact on American politics, and therefore represents only an attempt to bully former Prime Minister Trudeau in order to promote an ascendant pro-American right compatible with Trump. Only Alberta, among the regions with secessionist movements, would fit culturally with the United States and would have a chance of being a state compatible with Republicans and Trump’s conservative populism in the context of the political calculations that have always accompanied the debates about accepting new states.
The Smokescreen
First of all, I would like to emphasize that although I believe that Trump’s populist projects resonate with important constituencies and can be implemented (regardless of the degree of success), in this case his main concern is not related to expansion or to creating a country project for the USA that would mobilize the population and mitigate internal divisions. If he had, then he would have focused sequentially on his populist messages to generate directional force and not to jam his own messages. Rather, I believe that Trump is launching populist bait to monopolize the media space and prevent anti-Trump narratives from Democrats or the development of various scandals that would affect his inauguration on January 20, 2025 and the first critical days of his term, when his Cabinet picks must be confirmed by Congress. On the one hand, we have the anniversary of the protests of January 6, 2021 that resulted in the invasion of the Capitol by pro-Trump voters protesting the loss of the elections. Democrats practiced atrocity propaganda with this event, which was reflected in the draconian treatment of the protesters compared to those who took part in the violent Black Lives Matter protests. Donald Trump practically prevented the commemoration of the protests this year on the eve of his taking power. The pro-Trump electoral coalition has also begun to disintegrate on the issue of legal migration following scandals and social media debates over the abuse of H-1B visas for highly skilled workers, which has turned into an informal battle over all forms of legal migration.
The most important domestic challenge for Trump, which will probably be resolved by the time this article is published, is the resumption on January 15 of the general strike of the 35 thousand dock workers on the East Coast and the coast of the Gulf of Mexico (or America?). The first general strike, in October 2024, risked being a real “October surprise” that would sabotage Kamala Harris’ electoral chances. The presidential team would have been blamed by the public for the absence of goods on the shelves and the disruption of global production chains. President Biden has pressured logistics companies to offer the International Longshoremen Association a wage increase of about 65%, but they have been unable to reach an agreement on the union’s demand not to automate ports (which the US needs to be competitive with Chinese and European ports). Joe Biden has dropped the bombshell in Trump’s court, because a crisis in imports and exports would generate significant costs and mark the first hundred days of the Trump Administration. Despite meeting with Harold Daggett, the leader of the ILA, and launching pro-worker messages on social media, Donald Trump has yet to announce a breakthrough in negotiations with the ILA to avoid a general strike. His bombastic and varied statements serve to camouflage the incipient crises of the new term.
Panamanian Anxieties
Donald Trump’s statements about the Panama Canal may arouse astonishment but not surprise. Populism on the subject of the canal dates back to the Carter-Torrijos Treaty that established the restitution program. Ronald Reagan intensely criticized this agreement, which brought him a major victory at a time when Americans were aware of the importance of the Canal (let’s not forget that even former presidential candidate and senator, John McCain, was born in the American zone of the Panama Canal). Today, the Canal facilitates the transit of 6% of global trade and 60% of the Asian trade with the East Coast of the US, being a nodal point for American and global trade. Beyond the wounded pride of having lost an asset that they themselves developed after the French failed (and the state of Panama has existed since 1903 separate from Colombia specifically to facilitate American control of the area), the American elites are alarmed by China’s strong influence in the area. Since the departure of the last remnants of the American administration of the Canal in 1999, the two most important ports located at its ends, Balboa and Colon (Cristobal), have been concessioned to the Hong Kong-based Hutchison Whampoa company, controlled by billionaire Li Ka-shing. However, the fact that Panama recognized Taiwan limited relations with mainland China, leaving Hong Kong as the preferred vector for Chinese capital and, in 1999, the American perspective on Hong Kong was anyway benign. This has since changed, and the reconfirmation of the concession for another 25 years in 2021 has triggered American anxieties about the safety of crossing the Canal in the event of conflict and the alleged espionage potential that control over these areas offers to the Chinese state, which has very close relationships with companies in strategic fields. At the same time, the entire Sino-Panamanian paradigm changed in 2017, when Panama stopped recognizing Taiwan as legitimate China (one of the few countries in the world with this policy) and recognized Beijing. Suddenly, relations took on a new dimension – numerous infrastructure projects were initiated, such as a high-speed railway between Panama City and David, bridges over the Panama Canal and investments in telecommunications and port facilities, as well as in a large network of Confucius Institutes. The failure of some projects has raised fears of a “debt trap” similar to that of Montenegro and Sri Lanka. Despite these difficulties, the relationship has continued to evolve, and reports by international relations scholars indicate Panama as the state with the second greatest Chinese influence in Latin America after Peru. Even if there has been no evidence that there is substance to Trump’s accusations of overtaxing American transporters, the Sino-Panamanian relationship continues to generate unease in Washington, where the “Monroe Doctrine” is still relevant to the American perspective on the Western Hemisphere.
Greenlandic Dreams
Donald Trump has also made claims to Greenland, bringing back the idea from his first term to acquire this territory for the US. Compared to the expansionist Canadian and Panamanian proposal, this idea has potential, although the risk of alienating a loyal ally should give him pause. The strident way in which Trump was ridiculed by the American press and opposition during his first term hides the reality of an over 150-year-old American project to acquire this 2.16 million km2 territory with only 60 thousand inhabitants. The first attempt was in parallel with the acquisition of Alaska by Secretary of State William Seward. He dealt with both projects, but only the Alaskan one went down in history as a success. During World War I, the Americans made another offer for the Danish territories, but in 1917 they obtained only the Danish Virgin Islands (now a US territory), which the Danes considered merely an investment to which they had no historical or emotional attachment.
Fearing an attack by Nazi Germany through Greenland after the occupation of Denmark, the Americans occupied the island in 1941 without informing the government-in-exile. After the war ended, they offered the Danes the equivalent of $10 billion today for the island. The Danes refused, but they were unable to defend the territory and signed a treaty with the Americans in 1951 by which they took over responsibility for the military protection of the island (in practice, a form of co-sovereignty). This treaty was an exercise in public diplomacy, because the Americans refused to withdraw their troops at the request of the Danes and they did not have the ability to force them. The economic dimension that is so heavily emphasized today (rare minerals, uranium, oil and gas) was not as well known or relevant. Even at the time, Greenland was seen as an essential maritime and land shield for the North American continent. During the Cold War, the island was essential for US air defense, being on the shortest route between Moscow and Washington for strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The US-Danish agreement provided for full sovereignty within the US bases. Thule Base became the northernmost US base, and the Americans built several military facilities, including the hope of stationing nuclear-tipped Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles in Greenland. Most recently in 2020, the Americans budgeted for a new military port to facilitate the mobility of US forces and supply logistics.
After the Cold War, Greenland remained strategically essential. Russian submarines and ships frequently visited the area, which was so vast that surveillance was very difficult. Thule, now Pituffik, became a US Space Force base and a strategic asset as a ground base for military and intelligence satellites. The Arctic plays a critical role in space security. Any satellite in a polar or sun-synchronous orbit, such as those in critical communications, imaging and weather satellite constellations, requires an Arctic ground station for tracking, telemetry and control. As space assets become more numerous and capable and competition with Russia and China increases, the Arctic will become increasingly important.
The debate over physical control of Greenland is only one piece of this puzzle. Greenland is also a nodal point for control of Arctic shipping routes that will become viable due to global warming. There are three Arctic routes – the one near the Russian Siberian coast is already used for part of the year by the Chinese to shorten the route between Shanghai and Rotterdam from 33 to 19 days. Greenland is critical to the other two – the Northeast Passage, sought in vain in the 19th century, connecting Asia to the Atlantic through Northern Canada, passing through Western Greenland; and the Central Passage, which passes right through the geographic North Pole, which would exit into the Atlantic through Eastern Greenland. Control of these routes, as they become viable, will become a source of tremendous military and commercial power in the future, and Donald Trump has emphasized American Arctic policy during his first term, planning a fleet of icebreakers similar to those of Russia or China.
In parallel, the American view of Greenland (and Donald Trump’s aggressive and public version) is based on the actions of the Danes themselves towards the island and the consistent way in which they implemented their liberal principles that limited their pragmatic options. In 1985, the island used its new local autonomy to opt out of the European Community, becoming an associated territory and not part of the EU borders that French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot had been talking about. The Danes established that the island’s inhabitants were the owners of the resources and the recipients of any royalties, but they continued to subsidize the island with at least ten thousand euros per inhabitant per year, equivalent to 40% of GDP. Since 2011, it has been established that Greenlanders have the right to become an independent state, and since February 2024, the Greenlandic Prime Minister has stated that the island will move towards independence in the long term, although he did not add that the remaining time in Denmark would be useful for the latter to finish financing local infrastructure such as roads and airports. The Americans have anticipated the trend towards Greenland independence since the 1970s and, according to public documents, planned to establish a very close relationship with the new state.
Therefore, the vehemence with which Trump was denounced for suggesting buying Greenland hides long-term efforts to establish co-sovereignty in the area and to explore the possibilities of bringing the island to the American side, in one way or another. Of all the expansion options suggested by Trump, this is the most feasible. Even if the Danish people are hurt in their self-esteem by Trump’s rhetoric, there are probably people in Copenhagen who lament the way they tied their hands on the island and let it become a burden and would accept the possibility of gaining something from it, even American influence, before the island declares independence. Nor is it necessary for the island to become a US territory or state (the first option would be the most difficult from the perspective of public opinion) - it is enough that economic, military or space interests are credibly secured through agreements with whatever government the area has. Right now, the strength of the US partnership with Denmark in ensuring confidence in the security of American assets is undermined by the separatist power in Nuuk and the historical experience of how quickly changes in sovereignty affected US interests in Cuba or Granada, or European interests in the Suez Canal.
Conclusion
As usual, Donald Trump should be taken seriously, not literally. His bombastic statements serve as a starting point for negotiations, not necessarily on that subject. However, contrary to the posture of American elites and the media, his proposals related to the Panama Canal and Greenland differ only in details from the vision of the American deep state, which has always tried to control the nodal points of the world and ensure American security and the primacy of the nation, especially in the Western Hemisphere. It is very likely that, like the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the trade war with China and the emphasis on nationalist industrial policies, Trump’s current positions will be embedded in the American political DNA even by his opponents, who will look for ways to implement American strategic projects within the self-imposed limits of the rules-based international system through which the US exercises its influence in the world. These options include pressure on Panama to limit cooperation with China, or attempts to establish itself as the preferred partner of a future independent Greenlandic state. There is another reason why annexation cannot be a real option, in any of the cases cited by Trump, from Greenland to Canada. On the one hand, the American political class would oppose an overly ambitious project because it would validate the double-standard rhetoric used by US rivals. Second, and perhaps most importantly, Republicans are not prepared to affect the structural American electoral calculus to their disadvantage. Absolutely all the territories circulated in the international press as areas of American expansion would produce democratic states, through their economic, ethnic, demographic, cultural, etc. structure, even if for different reasons. Now, Republicans are fervently against admitting as states into the Union territories that have already been ruled for almost a hundred years, such as the associated territories in the Pacific, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands. Let’s not forget the classic case of the capital territory, the District of Columbia. Each new state would be guaranteed two senators, plus at least three representatives, and Puerto Rico, with over 3 million people, would also have five representatives. All of these territories would also get at least 3 electoral votes in presidential races. All of Canada, regardless of the configuration of its division into states, would be a Democratic stronghold (with the possible exception of the province of Alberta, which resembles Texas in many ways). And Canada integrated piecemeal is much more valuable in electoral calculations (through the number of senators and the preferential treatment of small states in terms of representatives and electoral votes). Trump’s expansion would be practically suicide for Republicans, who, until the Trumpist electoral coalition coalesced, depended on activist supermajorities showing up to vote to remain viable, including in states like Texas where the American majority had already become a minority in recent decades of legal and illegal migration.
Therefore, Trump’s statements are the product of a strategy to distract attention from the domestic American problems that will affect the success of his first hundred days in office, which is an important benchmark for Americans of the success to expect from a new president. Trump would not say no to being the first American President since Dwight Eisenhower to enlarge the USA and change the flag, but his realistic demands are aimed at access to resources, room for maneuver for military, logistical and space projects and a favorable terrain to counter the great American rivals in Latin America, in the Arctic and in the global economic space, characterized by interdependencies that are leveraged geopolitically by those who manage to develop them.
Photo source: PxHere.com.