TheMarketForIdeas

A lorry crashes into a crowd of people gathered at the Berlin Christmas fair, killing 12 and injuring 56. At an art exhibition in Ankara, Turkey, Russian ambassador Andrei Karlov is shot dead by a young police officer who shouts Allah’s name and vindictive slogans against military actions in Syria before being gunned down himself by the Turkish police. In Zürich, Switzerland, a man enters an Islamic Centre and opens fire upon the people praying there, injuring three before taking his own life. He had killed another person a day prior. What all these incidents have in common is that they had all taken place on the same day, namely December 19, 2016. Nearly a fortnight later, on New Year’s Eve night, an unidentified armed individual murdered 39 people and injured another 40 in an assault at a New Year’s Eve party in Istanbul, Turkey; at least 16 of the victims are foreign citizens. These are the four vicious attacks that have bloodied the winter holidays in Europe and raised concerns regarding the next potential target of jihadist violence. Reactions all over the civilised world and at every level of discourse – from the man on the street to high government officials – have unanimously condemned the acts as heinous crimes against humanity and denounced their perpetrators as barbarians. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the incidents in Berlin and Istanbul, while the assassination of the Russian ambassador and the Zürich shootings were apparently perpetrated by “lone wolves” (i.e. individuals holding no allegiance or affiliation to any particular organised terrorist group, as they are commonly known).

The attacks are the latest events in what has been dubbed “The Wave of Terror in Europe”, a series of terrorist strikes on European territory, coinciding with the spike in the activity and influence of the Islamic State in 2014. The first incident is considered to have been the shootings at the Brussels Jewish Museum on May 24, 2014, committed by a jihad-motivated former fighter in the Syrian Civil War. Since then, numerous high-profile attacks have shocked European countries in their barbarity, scale, victim tally and most intriguingly, degree of organisation displayed: the notorious Charlie Hebdo and Île-de-France shootings in January 2015 (17 dead, 20 injured); the combined shootings and bomb detonations in Paris, the massacre at the Bataclan theatre, as well as the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, all on the same day of November 13, 2015 (130 dead, 368 injured); the Brussels bombings in March 2016 (32 dead, 340 injured); the Nice attack on July 14, 2016 (86 dead, 434 injured), and lately, the aforementioned events in December 2016. Apart from these, numerous smaller scale attacks took place over the past two and a half years, concentrated primarily in France, Belgium, Germany and Turkey. According to a compilation made by the British newspaper The Telegraph[1], 20 attacks took place in Turkey alone over the past 18 months, committed by the Islamic State, the Kurdish militant groups Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) as well as lone wolves.

The climate grew ever tenser, as they raise questions regarding Europe’s ability to protect itself against terrorism, the effectiveness of military action against the Islamic State in Levant to contain the threat, as well as the role of immigrants in the security landscape of Europe.

Fears had risen that there might be a connection between the three attacks on December 19; more specifically, there were concerns that they might have been part of a coordinated strike against Europe, although that appears unlikely, as neither the Turkish assailant, nor the Zürich shooter had any confirmed ties to any terrorist organisation. Nevertheless, the climate grew ever tenser, as they raise questions regarding Europe’s ability to protect itself against terrorism, the effectiveness of military action against the Islamic State in Levant to contain the threat, as well as the role of immigrants in the security landscape of Europe. It is also worth noting that the attacks came after a series of military successes against Islamic State positions in the Near East.

Profiles

Let us take a brief look at the perpetrators and their profiles. The Turkish policeman turned assassin, Mevlüt Mert Altîntaș, was a 22-year old police officer, who worked for the Turkish Special Police Forces, and hailed from a district in western Turkey with a strong nationalistic streak. Shortly before he decided to commit the attacks, he moved to a borough with a similar reputation for nationalism may provide hints towards his motivations, though in the absence of more information, it is bound to remain pure speculation. Both Putin and Erdogan have called the attack an attempt to disrupt relations between Russia and Turkey shortly before a diplomatic meeting between them and Iran to discuss the situation in Syria. Knowing that some strains of Turkish nationalism are tightly linked to Islam, and seeing that the assassin shouted Islamist slogans and condemned the military strikes in Syria, it is possible indeed that he may have felt that Turkey is being used as Christian Orthodox Russia’s marionette in the Middle East and doing its bidding by attacking other Sunni Muslims in Syria, which would confirm Putin and Erdogan’s theory. It is not unlikely that he had become radicalised and was inspired by Islamic jihadists; footage of the attack shows him raising one finger, a sign typically associated with the Islamic State, which is further supported by the Islamic State declaring Turkey as “the protector of the [Christian] cross”, and the protests of Turkish students just two days prior urging Russia to withdraw from Syria. Whatever the case, it is clear that the attack was linked to the unstable climate in Syria and the Levant and to radical Islam.

Both incidents followed the same pattern as other high-profile Islamic State strikes, targeting a large concentration of people at a time and place where the victims would be feeling relaxed and completely unsuspecting of the likelihood of an attack.

The shooter in Zürich is perhaps the most elusive of the cases analysed, as authorities have not yet established the motivations of the gunman, a 24-year-old Swiss citizen of Ghanaian origin. The gunman had quit his job shortly before the attack, suggesting premeditation, and was killed shortly after the murders; theories regarding his motivation have ranged from his purported interest in occult rituals, to Islamophobic sentiment in the country.

The Berlin attacker who hijacked the lorry was identified as a Tunisian citizen with a long history of violence and legal issues, who had been under surveillance by German intelligence following threats of an attack he was planning. The man had arrived in Europe as a refugee in 2011 and was involved in numerous incidents. He was fanatically dedicated to the Islamic State and had been planning an attack since Spring 2016, according to reports. He was later identified and shot dead by the German authorities. Similar to him, the Istanbul gunman had logistic support from the Islamic State to which he had pledged allegiance, and was identified as an Uzbek citizen. Turkish security stated that he had extensive experience in combat, as demonstrated by the manner of his infiltration into the nightclub and execution of the task he had undertaken (i.e. using a disguise, taking out the security agents and securing an escape route, the unfaltering determination to murder innocents etc.). Both incidents followed the same pattern as other high-profile Islamic State strikes, targeting a large concentration of people at a time and place where the victims would be feeling relaxed and completely unsuspecting of the likelihood of an attack (i.e. a Christmas fair, and a New Year’s Eve party).

Geopolitical shifts

Any visible negative impact on how they work together would badly hurt the image of both Russia and Turkey, given that it would severely weaken the credibility of their collaboration, and it could be interpreted as a concession of sorts towards terrorists, who in turn would be emboldened by an apparent success, and likely gain more recruits.

What is the geopolitical significance of these attacks and, more importantly, what are the potential consequences? The greatest concerns were tied unsurprisingly to the assassination of the Russian ambassador. Some voices raised the point that the incident could throw a monkey wrench in the relations between Russia and Turkey. However, the event will likely have the opposite short-term effect: it brings Russia and Turkey to work together closely to mediate the situation in the region. Not only that, but they do not really have any other sound choice. To actually allow any slowdown of their collaboration is self-defeating at this point. Turkey would be left in an unpleasant position from which it would be difficult to project power. With US President Donald Trump’s stated desire to decrease American involvement in the Middle East, and with various domestic issues simmering within, maintaining steady relations with Russia is, as far as Ankara policymakers are concerned, paramount to promoting its geostrategic agenda. Likewise, Russia needs a strong ally such as Turkey to take advantage of America’s stated intentions of detente and successfully cement its hold in the Middle and Near East. Plus, any visible negative impact on how they work together would badly hurt the image of both Russia and Turkey, given that it would severely weaken the credibility of their collaboration, and it could be interpreted as a concession of sorts towards terrorists, who in turn would be emboldened by an apparent success, and likely gain more recruits.

As it stands, Russia, Turkey and Iran have formally adopted a declaration to take the necessary steps to improve the situation in Syria and bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution, with the collaboration of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Geostrategically speaking, it is very likely that the solution will be a compromise between the three parts; while Turkey wants al-Assad out, Iran intends to keep him, and given his family’s historically close ties to Moscow, we may assert that whatever political solution will be worked out, it will include a part for al-Assad, perhaps in a less prominent political role. Most certainly, the political agenda will take into account the interests of these three states.

The geopolitical meaning of the other attacks is more nuanced, however. The nightclub shooting in Ankara, for instance, is further indication of the ground gained by Islamic radicalism in Central Asia; as such, the role of the more stable states in the region such as Kazakhstan becomes vital in order to contain the advancement of the terrorist threat. This is all the more relevant considering that China has a keen interest in the Central Asian region, with its search for stable energy suppliers and “One Belt, One Road” initiative, not to mention the risk of connecting Uyghur terrorist cells in western China to other terrorist groups operating in Central Asia and the Middle East, or the perils of transnational organised crime.

Europe at war with itself

The attack in Berlin is more relevant to the increasing euro-scepticism against the backdrop of the refugee inflow in Europe, given that the terrorist was one himself. Between incidents involving immigrants, such as the mass sexual assaults in Cologne, Germany, on the 2016 New Year Eve, and the terrorist attacks themselves, anti-immigration sentiment has burgeoned, with several European Union member states such as Hungary and Poland protesting against the EU’s policy to accommodate the refugee and building walls to keep out Muslim refugees. Even in the more accommodating countries, such as Germany, France, Sweden or Austria, right wing nationalist factions have seen quite a growth in popularity. For instance, in France, Marine Le Pen of the National Front is now in what appears to be a strong position for the French presidential elections of 2017 according to several opinion polls that give her as the likely victor in the first round of the elections and a contender in the second round, though opinions vary as to her chances of prevailing against her rivals. The National Front also managed to gain 3^rd place in the regional elections of 2015, having previously won the majority of votes on the first round. Le Pen and the National Front are known for their euro-scepticism, anti-immigration stance and nationalism. Her strongest opponent, Republican François Fillon, has a similar position in that he advocates strict surveillance of the Muslim community. Both Fillon and Le Pen have a favourable view of Vladimir Putin and his politics.

In Germany, Angela Merkel’s party has seen a slow but steady decline during the past 3 years as opinion polls show, slipping to 36% in January 2017, from to 42% in August 2014. The rightwing populist faction Alternative für Deutschland (i.e. “Alternative for Germany”, in German; abbreviated as AfD), by contrast, has seen a steady increase in popularity, growing from 5% to 15% within the same timeframe and achieved remarkable results in the state elections of 2016, reflecting German citizens’ disappointment with Merkel’s management of the refugee crisis. AfD has also been reported by several news sources, such as Der Spiegel, to have close ties with Putin’s United Russia party[2]. In Austria, Norbert Hofer of the Freedom Party of Austria, a faction with very similar views to those of the AfD or the National Front, lost the Austrian presidential elections in 2016 by only a slim margin to Alexander van der Bellen in a competition that was repeated following controversies over irregularities in the voting process and lost again. Lastly, in Sweden, the nationalistic, far-right, euro-sceptic Sweden Democrats have consistently enjoyed electoral success over the last few years. Having earned 12.9% of the votes cast at the 2014 general elections, ranking 3^rd, it now comes second according to the most recent opinion polls in December 2016, having risen above the 20% mark, while the Social Democratic Party, which had won the 2014 elections with 31% of all votes cast, has fallen to about 25%. Meanwhile, the Dutch PVV or Freedom Party, led by the flamboyant Geert Wilders (photo, right), has become the most popular single party in the Netherlands according to polls, even though it is still beneath the majority needed to govern with the entire political system allied against it.

What all this means is that the refugee crisis has caused some noticeable shifts in Europe’s political outlook and has the potential to change Europe’s politics in the future. Should the right-wing groups gain significant territory in the realms of policymaking, we may see an increasing divisiveness in European politics which will likely work against it. Although current opinion polls suggest that in most countries, such parties are still lagging behind other, more moderate factions, we must not forget the precedent with Donald Trump’s election as president despite poll results and to the shock of most observers; Trump himself is not much different from his European counterparts, for instance Le Pen, in the core aspects of his populist, anti-immigration discourse and general political outlook. With varying agendas and political potentials, it is difficult to predict the exact outcomes of right wing victories in Europe’s elections

Populism, nationalism and euro-scepticism do not bode well for a European Union seeking deeper integration, so apart from the refugee crisis, European countries could also face societal frictions, especially in countries that have adopted multiculturalism and a multiethnic model.

in the following years. Populism, nationalism and euro-scepticism do not bode well for a European Union seeking deeper integration, so apart from the refugee crisis, European countries could also face societal frictions, especially in countries that have adopted multiculturalism and a multiethnic model. These frictions could serve to increase the risk of youths being radicalised by Islamic militancy.

There may also be notable changes in terms of geostrategy as well. Assuming, for instance, that AfD and the National Front secure victories in next year’s elections in Germany and France, respectively, we may see closer ties with Russia. That could lead to further energy deals and a lifting of the EU restrictions on Gazprom that limit the use of the Russian-German Nord Stream pipeline to less than a third of its full capacity. With an elevated importance of the Nord Stream, Germany can further become an energy hub in Europe, thus forging an interdependent energy relationship with Russia. Moreover, detente with Russia could mean new opportunities for defusing the situation in Ukraine. Along with a potentially stronger position in the Mediterranean, Russia would tighten its grip on Europe and counter China’s prospective investments in Central Asia that may pose a challenge to Russia’s role as energy superpower in Europe.

Conclusion

All in all, the attacks suggest that despite the successful military actions against the Islamic State in the Near and Middle East, it still possesses the capability to organise terrorist attacks on European territory. What should be of the greatest concern, however, is the Islamic State’s ability to continue inspiring people, to reach their hearts and minds and determine them to commit such atrocities, no matter how effective the military intervention against it may be. Famous quantum physicist and Nobel Prize winner Max Planck once said:

“A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it”.

The Islamic State must not only be countered abroad, in its own territory and bases. It must also be fought against from within, in the very societies where its ideology can find cracks and niches to seep into and breed new fighters ready to die for their cause. With decisive elections in some of Europe’s heavyweights lying not very far ahead, we can look towards two broad possible outcomes: either we will see significant governmental changes (and thus political uncertainty), though we cannot state now whether it will be for the better or worse, or the current factions will receive a renewed vote of confidence from the population, in which case they will need to find solutions to the challenges faced as part of the EU. Equally important to them will be finding a way to balance the desires and wishes of those who voted for them as well as the desires and wishes of those who voted against them.

[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/01/istanbul-nightclub-attack-sick-blood-carnage-bosphorus-deepens/

[2] http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-populists-forge-deeper-ties-with-russia-a-1089562.html