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Europe’s inclusive multipolarity, driven by climate diplomacy, faces its greatest test as geopolitical fractures threaten to derail the Paris Agreement’s momentum. With Washington and Beijing heading on a collision course and developing nations embarking on strategic non-alignment, Brussels must reinvent itself as a credible bridge-builder.

As of 2025, Washington formally withdrew from the Paris Agreement under an executive order title „Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements” [1], terminating US’ obligations under international climate finance commitments and signalling the emergence of isolationist tendencies. This move left the ambitious New Collective Quantified Goal [2], established at COP29 in Baku, which concretely builds on previous green transition and SDG-backed frameworks by assuming to raise 1,3 trillion EUR annually by 2035, underserved and lacking international prestige. This step back means that nowadays EU must carry the heavy burden of climate leadership as a standalone normative fort.

Therefore, European climate efforts are amongst its most tangible demonstration of global assertiveness and outward stances. For instance, in 2023, the EU contributed almost 30 billion EUR [3] to developing countries from public funds and mobilised an additional 7,2 billion in private allocations [4]. Nearly half of these economic mechanisms were devoted to adaptation or cross-cutting measures, with the majority of it provided in the form of grants. In turn, not only does this represent a significant share of global commitments but also a striking upward trend, as in 2022, EU climate finance stood at 28,5 billion EUR, already a jump from around 23 billion in previous years [5] [6]. These renewed and growing allocations underscore both the political determination to remain the world’s standard-bearer in climate diplomacy and the fiscal strain that inevitably follows.

These endeavours unfolded alongside record contributions from multilateral development banks, structures where European member states remain pivotal actors and contributors. Hence, in 2024 alone, MDBs collectively disbursed some 135 billion EUR for climate change and sustainable development, a 10% increase over the year before, with most of them pledging even higher shares until 2030. Thus, over 85 billion were sent to low- and middle-income countries, divided between mitigation (69%) and adaptation (31%), while a further 130 billion EUR in private equity was mobilised [7]. These figures are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the scale of global needs, especially as we face a tightening margin of error when tackling the climate crisis. Yet, with the post-Trump world dominated by US’ retreat and the Global South’s non-alignment, Europe finds itself shouldering disproportionate weight in sustaining the global climate and green architectures.

However, Brussels’ thorns throne has never rested on finance alone, particularly as EU continues to craft domestic regulatory frameworks that ripple outward. For instance, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism designed to impose carbon pricing on imports, was received by trading, industrial or commercial partners as both protectionist and pioneering. Also, the sweeping „Fit for 55” [8] normative package aims for a 55% cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, compared with 1990 levels, reforming emissions, boosting renewables, generating circular usage and tightening standards. Similarly, by setting a 2035 deadline for phasing out internal combustion engines, EU signals to industry and investors that decarbonisation is not optional but inevitable and it will follow through on its promise.

Furthermore, the 2021 European Climate Law [9] made these trajectories binding, enshrining the 2050 net-zero aspirations into legal practice, coupled with intermediate milestones, clear institutional oversight and governance models. This alignment between domestic coherence and international advocacy, while it might seem mundane, is crucial when it comes to reinforcing EU’s claim to climate leadership and green diplomacy. Otherwise, complementary initiatives like the European Grean Deal, Just Transition Mechanism, or Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation packages aim to redirect investment and reshape the Single Market in line with overarching climate goals.

Despite these achievements, unity remains frail, and Europe’s exemplary role is not free of tension, with a leaked draft in September 2025 revealing deep divisions [10] across all member states over the establishment of a legally binding 2040 climate target and subsequent agreements. In this context, France, Poland and Czech Republic, wary of the burden for their industries, were the promoters for flexibility and light(er) applicability, including the reliance on imported (problematic) carbon credits [11]. The divergences are more than mere procedural and negotiations, they cast doubt, and have long done so, on Brussels’ ability to project a credible and unitary image at COP30 and in the following horizons

Still, if we look at Europe’s foreign engagements, we can observe that, whilst cohesive internal commitment remains a constant battle, Brussels’ outward support stands strong. By way of example, in May 2025, EU pledged 5,1 billion EUR to South Africa [12] to support green transition, even as it faced a tariff war with the US. Moreover, such Just Energy Transition Partnerships across the Global South extend Brussels’ influence, albeit a slow down across most multilateral programs due to US’ withdrawal.

Otherwise, internally, the impacts of climate change are becoming a European reality, marking a rallying of wider publics and civil society around these domains. Nonetheless, while fossil-fuel tied CO₂ emissions fell by 8% in 2023, reaching a 60-year low [13] thanks to current alternatives, the slow transition impacts Europe’ socio-economic core. Thus, the ECB and EIB recently stressed that increasing drought risks and energy shortages could reduce Eurozone outputs by nearly 15% [14], primarily in agro-industrial and resource-rich sectors [15]. These realities feed internal debates, pushing some actors, including parts of CEE, to demand a 90% reduction by 2040 [16], comparative to 1990, a level of ambition that could redefine the bloc’s entire structure and behavioural model, almost entering a new Dark…Green Ages.

Until current ambitions are agreed, without mentioning exceptionally idealistic goals, Europe remains tested on its credibility. Hence, SFDR, designed to redirect financial allocations towards sustainable sectors, is under constant fire for greenwashing and private-public collusion and policy discussions are underway to strengthen transparency and rigorous standards for „sustainable” investment funds [17]. Moreover, EU’s Nature Restoration Law [18], with clear legally binding targets for ecosystem restoration, and the LIFE Programme for 2021-2027 [19], which are falling short of their promises, still can demonstrate that climate diplomacy extends to green justice and ecological preservation, even if through baby-steps. But most striking are the huge inconsistencies [20] across the unionist bloc, from fossil fuel subsidies, pollution-linked investments, natural habitat destruction through large-scale infrastructure, to ambiguous taxonomy rules, which remain vulnerabilities that are exploited by a more cautious global community.

Therefore, what emerges from this amalgamated climate is a paradoxical normative and political landscape. On one side, Europe, striving to be the backbone of multilateral climate action [21], wields unmatched regulatory power with far reaching consequences and retains the moral high ground, on the other, its white castle faces mounting divisions, fiscal strain [22] and wider geopolitical instability. Apart from growing tensions, for the Global South, whose demands for climate justice, adaptation finance and debt relief, grow louder [23] and involvement becomes mandatory, Europe risks to appear helpful but somewhat overstretched or selective in its incursions (a climate-backed neo-orientalism of sorts).

However, in the post-Trump era, marked by distance and self-interest, Brussels, with its goods and bads, is no longer one partner amongst many, but has emerged as the last remaining institutional and normative anchor for climate multilateralism and green diplomacy. Whether the plethora of legislative evolutions, including Paris Agreement’s green and sustainable transition dreams survive the rivalries of the 2020s will depend heavily on how we understand to balance ambition with pragmatism, idealism with realism and long-term gains with short-term pain. If Brussels misses, global climate governance models risk fracturing, into mitigation and adaptation blocs, into trade war zones and climate colonialism, into rhetoric without action, into grassroot intervention and top-to-bottom disregard.

Notes:

[1] The White House (2025) Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/putting-america-first-in-international-environmental-agreements/

[2] UNFCCC (2024) FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.22 Advance version: New collective quantified goal on climate finance. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2024_L22_adv.pdf

[3] Council of the European Union (2024) Council publishes 2023 international climate finance figures. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/05/council-publishes-2023-international-climate-finance-figures/

[4] Argus Media (2024) ‘EU contributed €31.2 bn public climate finance in 2024’. Available at: https://www.argusmedia.com/de/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2625355-eu-contributed-31.2bn-public-climate-finance-in-2024

[5] Council of the European Union (2023) Climate finance: Council approves 2022 international climate finance figures. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/23/climate-finance-council-approves-2022-international-climate-finance-figures/

[6] Rinnovabili.net (2022) ‘Climate finance: the EU finally opens its portfolio 24 in 2022’. Available at: https://www.rinnovabili.net/business/climate-finance-the-eu-finally-opens-its-portfolio-24-in-2022

[7] European Investment Bank (2025) ‘Multilateral development banks hit record USD 137 billion in climate finance to drive sustainable development worldwide’. Available at: https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2025-328-multilateral-development-banks-hit-record-usd137-billion-in-climate-finance-to-drive-sustainable-development-worldwide

[8] European Commission (n.d.) Delivering the European Green Deal – Fit for 55. Available at: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/european-green-deal/delivering-european-green-deal/fit-55_en

[9] European Union (2021) Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32021R1119

[10] Reuters (2025) ‘EU split over climate target deal next week, doubt draft shows’. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/cop/eu-split-over-climate-target-deal-next-week-doubt-draft-shows-2025-09-09

[11] Reuters (2025) ‘EU split over climate target deal next week, doubt draft shows’. [same as above] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/cop/eu-split-over-climate-target-deal-next-week-doubt-draft-shows-2025-09-09

[12] AP News (n.d.) [Title unspecified]. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/8e4ab12c1107219b6264f9aee58d83d9

[13] Energy & Clean Air (n.d.) ‘EU’s CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels drop 8 % to reach lowest levels in 60 years’. Available at: https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/eus-co2-emissions-from-fossil-fuels-drop-8-to-reach-lowest-levels-in-60-years/

[14] Financial Times (n.d.) [Title unspecified]. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/2b19b5f5-69c2-4d31-aac7-28b975487d4a

[15] European Investment Bank (2025) ‘European agriculture faces growing climate risks that EU can help counter, new study finds’. Available at: https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2025-214-european-agriculture-faces-growing-climate-risks-that-eu-can-help-counter-new-study-finds

[16] Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (n.d.) ‘How Europe wants to cut 90 % emissions by 2040 and what it means for investors’. Available at: https://www.iigcc.org/insights/how-europe-wants-to-cut-90-emissions-by-2040-and-what-it-means-for-investors

[17] ALFI (n.d.) ‘European sustainable investment funds study 2024’. Available at: https://www.alfi.lu/en-gb/pages/setting-up-in-luxembourg/responsible-investing/european-sustainable-investment-funds-study-2024

[18] European Commission (n.d.) Nature Restoration Law. Available at: https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/nature-restoration-law_en

[19] EU Observer (n.d.) ‘Europe’s energy divide: why the green transition risks leaving half the continent behind’. Available at: https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar92e23cbb

[20] Bruegel (n.d.) ‘Europeans still want climate action, don’t trust governments to deliver’. Available at: https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/europeans-still-want-climate-action-dont-trust-governments-deliver

[21] Jacques Delors Institute (n.d.) Green Horizons. Available at: https://www.europejacquesdelors.eu/publications/green-horizons

[22] Social Europe (n.d.) ‘Europe’s energy divide: why the green transition risks leaving half the continent behind’. Available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/europes-energy-divide-why-the-green-transition-risks-leaving-half-the-continent-behind

[23] Germanwatch (n.d.) ‘[Title unspecified]’. Available at: https://www.germanwatch.org/en/91728

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