TheMarketForIdeas

February is usually regarded as the month to celebrate love, especially with February 14 being celebrated as Valentine’s Day in many countries. Yet, with the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24 and the United States’ recent joint strikes on Iran alongside Israel on February 28, February might well be remembered for something else altogether. They do say that everything is fair in love and war. But war, politics and geopolitics, as stated as far back as Thucydides, have never been about fairness. It all boils down to pragmatism, setting goals, calculating odds, and taking chances deemed worth taking. Geopolitics is hardly an exact science, but there are some general rules and principles that guide the strategic actions of the players, each manifesting differently depending on the context. Thinkers from Sun Tzu to Thucydides to Machiavelli have all commented on the general principles underlying the decisions of actors in a variety of contexts, from warfare to court politics. Across time and place, their understanding of international politics reflected the anarchic realist school of thought focused on the use and pursuit of power as the foremost vector weaving the threads of conflicts and treaties. Realism has dominated international relations since as far back as history can record, and despite the fact that its application has varied according to geographic and historical context, its logic remains the same throughout time and space. Today, we witness China ramping up its military presence in Taiwan and the South China Sea, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, and, most surprisingly, the United States’ significantly more aggressive attitude when it comes to international affairs. We’ve witnessed US military strikes against Iranian nuclear sites on 22 June 2025 in the context of the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel, leading to a ceasefire. We’ve seen the United States amping up its aggressive stance towards Venezuela, culminating with its January strikes on the country and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. The US had previously launched strikes against Venezuela as well. In addition, the US has also bombed Islamic State (ISIS) positions in Syria and Iraq. Now, we are witnessing the United States and Israel launching relentless strikes against a Russia- and China-backed Iran.

Echoes of liberation and regime change

These hawkish actions represented a stark departure from the previous administration’s outlook, and contrast with President Trump’s personal political branding as a peace broker, controversially claiming that his mediation facilitated conflict resolution in several hotspots, most notably the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. In addition to the Trump Administration’s hostile discourse towards European allies, leading to an escalation of the ongoing trade war and an aggressive push to claim Greenland, the US renewed its threats to Iran – particularly in light of the country’s nuclear program – and, after failed negotiations, launched an attack on Iran alongside Israel on February 28, allegedly killing the theocracy’s supreme leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In both Venezuela’s and Iran’s case, international reactions have been strongly polarized. The United States’ geopolitical rivals have strongly condemned the United States’ actions, while allies have ranged from outright support (particularly among Arab states) to prudent calls for the parties to negotiate, particularly as Iran launched retaliatory strikes against Israel and US military bases throughout the Middle East. Interestingly enough, reactions from Venezuelan and Iranian citizens, especially those in the diaspora and those opposing the dictatorships, appear to have been, to at least some extent, supportive, if reserved and underscored by the panic caused by the strikes. To Romanians, this may bring to mind echoes of “Vin americanii!” (i.e. “the Americans are coming!”), the motto in Romania during the immediate post-war period, expressing the hope that American forces would liberate the country from the communist regime that had just been installed. Resistance groups against the communist government, including former members of the infamous Iron Guard, took refuge in the mountains; the hope for a major Western power – the Americans in particular – to overthrow the dictatorship helped them endure until around the early sixties. Part of the Iranian protesters, in particular, where bloody protests erupted towards the end of 2025 over the country’s economy, leading to deaths ranging from thousands to tens of thousands, were reported to have pleaded for help from Donald Trump in toppling the regime. Admittedly, owing to the Iranian regime controlling the internet and running a strong propaganda machine, in addition to its oppression of the populace, and in conjunction with the impossibility of conducting independent sociological research, it is difficult to gauge how the population feels about it with any degree of accuracy.

What cannot be denied or misconstrued as posturing is that the United States under Donald Trump’s administration seeks to reform its role internationally. For all of Donald Trump’s criticism of previous administrations for starting wars and his own administration pledging to end all wars, his recent actions in the first year since his inauguration have witnessed a mixed bag, with some efforts towards conflict resolution in some areas (e.g. between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, or between Iran and Hamas in light of the hostage crisis drawing Israeli military retaliation) occurring in conjunction with the United States’ military efforts against ISIS, Venezuela and Iran. Yet, as with anything relating to great-power politics, these actions go beyond mere imperialism; they are not random or acts of wanton violence, but calculated and strategic, albeit, as with anything related to great-power politics, uncertainty and unpredictability are inherently present and, as Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke once put it, “No plan survives contact with the enemy.” So, what is the common denominator between the United States’ actions in Iran and Venezuela, Russia’s unrelenting attacks on Ukraine, and China’s steady buildup of forces against Taiwan? All these have different motivations and contexts, but at their root, they are all pages ripped from the same playbook of power, in particular positional plays aimed at securing influence over geostrategic hotspots. The European Union is therefore facing a range of geopolitical challenges that is growing ever more uncomfortable, torn between supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia, Donald Trump’s increasing calls for military aid against Iran in the Middle East, and the debilitating economic consequences of an escalating war owing to increasing fuel prices, all while battling increasing pressure from within from populist and nationalist forces that seek to capitalize upon the establishment’s fumbles in order to sway the population to their side. An apocryphal anecdote that the internet quickly took to claims that an old Chinese saying goes, “May you live in interesting times” – an underhanded way of wishing someone to undergo heavy upheavals and crises. It seems times have grown unwelcomely interesting indeed.

Short-circuits in the supply line of credibility

Much to the detriment of the United States’ image and credibility, its campaign against Iran is beginning to mirror Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s initial forays into Ukraine were powerful and relentless, as were the US strikes that eventually killed Ali Khamenei and, allegedly, gravely injured his son who was chosen as his successor, Mojtaba Khamenei. Yet, just as Ukraine received timely help from the Western world, enabling it to fight back against Russian forces, so has Iran received aid from Russia and China. Although initially it was assumed they would keep their distance, Iran’s spokesperson confirmed that Iran receives its share of diplomatic, economic and military support from its allies, while more recent reports have revealed that Russia provides Iran with intelligence on US military maneuvers while China discreetly supplies military technology to Iran. Lastly, just as Ukraine has defied Russia’s expectations of a war ending quickly, so has Iran proven unexpectedly resilient. This is further punctuated by Donald Trump’s seemingly contradictory statements. On the one hand, he often reports incredibly strong military advances in Iran, claiming devastating destruction wrought upon the latter’s military capabilities and asserting that victory is at hand. On the other hand, he has been calling upon NATO allies to help (despite earlier refusing the United Kingdom’s offer of aid, claiming they were helping “after the war was already won”) and alleviating sanctions on Russia’s oil and, bafflingly enough, on Iran’s oil as energy prices skyrocketed. These actions all contradict his earlier boasts of near-total victory over Iran. While rhetorically he continues to proclaim victory and underscore the desperation of the Iranian officials, his credibility is undercut by his ongoing disappointment with the United States’ NATO allies, going so far as to threaten to withdraw US support from NATO, which disguises a deeper threat, namely that of allowing Russia – its economy now benefitting from the oil crisis entailed by the war – to be free to launch attacks on European countries and NATO members without the United States intervening. The Trump Administration’s apparent idiosyncrasies certainly do little to foster reliability with regard to its allies.

Europe between principle, pressure and exposure

European Union states – in particular NATO member states – have, for their part, cautiously stayed out of all-out involvement in the war. Indeed, from a purely legal standpoint, the European NATO members have absolutely no reason to get involved in the war. NATO has always been a purely defensive alliance acting on the principle that, when one of the members is attacked, all NATO members will retaliate as per its famous Article 5. However, Iran has not, as yet, attacked any NATO member state. Not only that, but NATO members are acutely aware that any involvement in the Middle East will reignite the same cycle of destabilization, causing further radicalization and a rise in the activity of terrorist cells, which would inevitably target European territories as well as jeopardize any hope for sustainable governance in the Middle East. Furthermore, the United States launched its attacks alongside Israel without conferring with its NATO allies. Since the US chose to act unilaterally, it is not surprising that its European partners now refuse to participate in the war. In addition to all this, the current White House leadership has been far from friendly with EU and NATO allies in general. The Trump Administration escalated tariffs in 2025, citing unfair trade relations with the European Union and criticizing NATO members for failing to meet their quotas in terms of defense spending. Add into the mix the recent spats regarding Greenland, and there is not much room to argue that the United States’ European allies feel any incentive to militarily involve themselves in a war against Iran. There are several reasons why this may be the case beyond legal considerations. For one, there is the obvious fear that, should any single EU country involve itself in the war alongside the US, or even alongside other countries, NATO’s Article 5 would not activate and they would not benefit from the full support of the North Atlantic Alliance, while practically painting a bullseye on themselves for Iranian missiles, especially since Iran has directly threatened that any state aiding the US is a legitimate target. Iran has also mounted quite the opposition and surprised observers with missiles that can hit targets up to 4,000 kilometers away, well beyond prior estimates.

Additionally, there is a likelihood that the European allies are waiting for the US to dial back the tariffs it imposed on imports from the European Union. Given the size of EU–US trade relations, the EU may simply be expecting the US to offer economic concessions before the EU would offer aid, and even in this scenario, the most optimistic support the EU could offer would be mostly logistical in nature, as direct military involvement (i.e. EU military leadership coordinating attacks alongside US counterparts, let alone boots on the ground) would automatically implicate them as active parties in the war. The European Union is also forced to choose between helping the US in Iran or helping Ukraine against Russia. It is a double threat that the EU must face, but the more urgent one is evidently Russia, so it is only rational for the EU to focus primarily on Ukraine, as the defeat of the latter would mean Russian troops directly patrolling the EU’s doorstep, a threat that gains new meaning considering the US has ceased its direct military aid to Ukraine and indirectly threatened not to come to the aid of NATO allies should Russia attack. More poignantly, we need to consider that, should the EU involve itself in the war against Iran, it is highly likely Iran will receive support (even if only covertly) from China, Russia or North Korea. This means that the war would inevitably be prolonged. Economically, the Iranian leadership stated it would attack any ships passing through the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz, which would also affect energy transportation involving European ships. The economic crisis and rising fuel prices would hit both the European and American economies hard, which would directly benefit Russia owing to its oil exports, which would fund its military machine and enable it to take advantage of the EU stretching itself between Ukraine and Iran in order to seize a decisive victory in Ukraine. Domestically, this would immensely favor nationalist and populist factions, fostering internal tensions as current European governments would face either losing power to their rivals or, worse, resorting to dishonest politicking to prevent that outcome (and further losing credibility while also galvanizing opposition among the general population).

Lastly, there is the issue of diplomacy to consider. The EU has prided itself on its dedication to democratic rule of law, sovereignty, human rights and international institutions. Assisting the US in an unprovoked war against Iran would definitely ruin its reputation and diplomatic soft power beyond repair. Taken together, all this paints a situation where Europe’s refusal to aid the US in its military efforts against Iran has less to do with spite or “getting even with Trump” and far more to do with deeper strategic calculations and considerations. EU member states have also faced internal political tensions to varying degrees, as local citizens’ discontent with their governments helping Ukraine, to what is perceived as the neglect of domestic issues, has fueled opposition. As for the United States, current developments point to a standoff with NATO. For all of Donald Trump’s claims that NATO allies have abandoned the United States in their hour of need, the United States’ military hostility towards Iran seems to serve more as a litmus test of the ability of the United States to rally its allies to its cause and see which allies are more amenable to its demands, although this seems to have been a secondary side effect. Several European countries have explicitly refused to aid US efforts in Iran and have denied access to either their airspace or their airbases, while the United Kingdom has offered cautious help, scoffed at by the Trump Administration, which dismissed it as performative and overdue, accusing the United Kingdom of only jumping in to help after the war was won. Yet opinions differ on whether or not the war – which has not yet ended as of mid-April 2026 – has actually been won or is even going according to plan, as the United States’ operation against Iran has overall been deemed a mixed bag at best and a failure at worst, if only because, rather than establishing control over the Strait of Hormuz, it only served to further cement Iran’s control over it, China’s diplomatic prominence, and the limits of the United States’ military reach.

Mistimed? Misjudged? Misread? Miscalculated?

There are, however, a few likely explanations for the current situation in the Middle East. The simplest one is that the United States leadership simply overestimated its likelihood of victory in Iran. The enthusiasm and momentum gathered after swiftly diving into Venezuela and scooping up both Maduro and his wife may have given the US leadership overconfidence in its ability to perform the same in Iran, especially following last summer’s successful airstrikes in Iran. Nevertheless, this would imply that seasoned military generals and intelligence analysts would patently ignore the differences in geographical location, military capability, and support networks between Iran and Venezuela (owing to Iran’s proximity to and tight relations with both China and Russia), as well as the well-known consequences of the United States’ previous involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan; nevertheless, failure stemming from faulty intelligence, undue optimism or unanticipated turns of events is not unheard of. For instance, it is quite possible that the United States may have underestimated the ability and willingness of Russia and China to back Iran, especially after last summer’s airstrike and the United States’ operation in Venezuela. Not only that, but the US may have misjudged Iran’s ability to replace the leaders it lost to US-Israeli strikes with leadership that, while not as prominent, was still able to keep an iron grip on the country’s domestic affairs (especially with the infamous IRGC, i.e. the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, still in charge). At the same time, US leadership may also have overestimated the ability and/or willingness of the Iranian people to instigate a public uprising to topple the regime. The United States may have hoped, given the recent protests in Iran, to create a power vacuum and offer enough momentum to the Iranian people in order to topple the current leadership, which evidently has not happened. This was additionally compounded by the fact that the Iranian opposition is too fractured in order to coalesce and overcome the ruling establishment, which, out of self-preservation, elected a conservative head. Taken together, especially when coupled with Trump’s open discontent with the new leaders chosen by the Iranian establishment after the death of Ali Khamenei (Trump even going so far as to say that Iran should have consulted him first), this further strengthens the point that things in Iran did not take the turn expected by the US and Israeli leaders.

It is very probable that the US and Israel hoped to destabilize the Iranian leadership and see leaders who would be more amenable to complying with the demands of American and Israeli leadership. Additional nuance is brought by the recent information that has surfaced alleging that the Iranian government, specifically the IRGC, attempted to have Donald Trump assassinated in 2024, likely as retaliation for the assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in 2020 following an airstrike ordered by Trump. If true, this adds additional context to the United States’ actions in Iran starting in 2025 as being more than just a territorial power grab, but also about sending a message that nobody who threatens US leadership is safe from retaliation. It is also not beyond imagination that the US and Israel may have acted on sensitive intelligence that necessitated urgent operations, albeit for now that remains merely a matter of speculation. Alternatively, another explanation is that the US did not want to fully topple the regime, only to attack several key installations, gain control of key positions, and eliminate certain key figures, which is what they claim they wanted to do – however, this is complicated by their calls to allies and contradictory statements, swinging between boasting about victory and vituperating NATO allies while simultaneously claiming the US did not need NATO help, between praising discussions held with Iranian officials and threatening to bomb Iran “back to the Stone Age”, between insisting that Iranian officials begged for peace talks and bickering with Iran over the latter’s denials of any plea for peace talks or ceasefires. The United States, at each point, claimed that its operations were going as planned, but still decided to lift sanctions on Russia in order to mitigate the effects of Iran’s tightening grip on the Strait of Hormuz, a diplomatic move widely decried as a mistake that cost the US some credibility and prestige, one the US would not have made without reason. Even in this scenario, the United States appears rather to have acted in a bid for damage control, further underscoring the theme that things took an unfavorable turn, forcing the United States to turn to allies for help. The Trump Administration has expressed its disappointment on more than one occasion with NATO allies, accusing the latter of not coming to the aid of the United States despite the United States being the largest contributor to NATO, hence the ongoing US threats to withdraw from the alliance.

A more reserved and conservative (pun intended) assessment is that the United States intended to gain leverage over Iran through strikes and attempted to overwhelm it in pursuit of its goal. The goal was likely a combination of the following: regime change; the occupation of certain key positions in order to force Iran to agree to its terms; a bid to gain control of Iran’s oil exports, as it did with Venezuela; and enhancing its sphere of influence. The operation rested on a number of assumptions. One would be that Iran’s leadership would be concentrated around a prominent personality such as Ali Khamenei and that, like all dictatorships centered on a singular, prominent strongman, eliminating him and his associates would create a power vacuum that would destabilize Iran’s leadership long enough to prevent it from mounting any real response to US efforts, facilitating a clean military sweep. This thesis receives additional support from the anti-dictatorship protests in early 2026 in Iran, when Iranian forces brutally cracked down on protesters, offering false hope for a popular uprising that would increase the likelihood of the Islamist regime toppling. Whatever the case, Iran fought back harder than expected. Not only that, but Iran attacked US allies in the Gulf – oil-rich states harboring American bases. The rationale for this was three-pronged: military, political and economic. Military, for attempting to impede any support local airbases could have brought to the oncoming US carriers and planes; political, for aiming to increase domestic pressure on US leadership to withdraw in order to prevent losing more American soldiers stationed in those Gulf countries attacked by Iran; and economic, for causing an increase in oil prices. Iran’s strategy is to outlast the United States militarily while making use of its control over its formidable oil reserves and the Strait of Hormuz to hit the United States’ economy in order to increase domestic and international pressure. Iran has also threatened to attack any Western tanker that supports the US, further aiming to isolate the US from allied support. Iran’s resilience, aided by Russia and China, increases the opportunity costs for the US, increasing the pressure either to defeat Iran militarily (at great cost in terms of military resources, economic performance and possibly human life) or accept negotiations on Iran’s terms (again, at great cost in terms of credibility as a major power).

The Strait of Hormuz as strategic chokepoint

The United States responded accordingly, but not without costs to its military and diplomatic prestige, which it now attempts to salvage by claiming victory and attempting to frame the current state of events as exactly the plan it had all along. The most charitable interpretation is that it was an application of an ancient Chinese stratagem – one of the famous Thirty-Six Stratagems – called “besiege Wei to rescue Zhao”, named after two Chinese Warring States involved in the Battle of Guiling in the mid-fourth century. The stratagem basically advises feigning an attack on one target, forcing the enemy to divert resources to defend it, while the attacker then redirects the attack to the real intended target. In other words, the US misrepresented its initial objective as a wish to conquer Iran (or at least change its leadership to be more amenable to Western demands), whereas what it really wanted was to gain control of key strategic points, notably Kharg Island (which is responsible for most of Iran’s oil exports). This is supported by attacks focusing on that target and by Donald Trump’s statements about seizing Iranian oil. However, the notion that this was the plan all along is contradicted by decisions such as lifting some sanctions on Russia’s oil and even on Iran’s oil in order to prevent further economic damage, a silent admission of the damage Iran’s resistance has caused, or by the decision to have supercarriers redeployed from the South China Sea to the Middle East, a silent concession to China that allows it to strengthen its position in a region where the US has vocally contested China’s influence. More recently, the United States has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, essentially the Middle Eastern version of a Mexican standoff where neither Iran’s oil buyers nor Iran itself can benefit from it. The strategy is ostensibly to add pressure on China via oil shortages in order to pressure Iran into negotiating. The caveat with this strategy is that China has wisely diversified its energy suppliers, including oil suppliers, and is also seeking to reduce its reliance on oil, so the impact of the blockade should not be as immediately devastating. However, many of China’s suppliers (accounting for about 50% of China’s oil imports) are in the Middle East and rely on the Strait of Hormuz for their energy exports; hence, a total blockade would definitely hit China’s oil imports. Another thing the blockade can do is limit China’s exports as purchasing power diminishes owing to the inflationary effect of the oil crisis, leading to a decrease in consumption and disruption of supply lines.

The geopolitical ripple effects on Europe and Asia

When looking at things geopolitically, the United States probably gambled on the idea that Russia was too involved in its war against Ukraine to be able to help Iran, while China would take a more diplomatic approach. In other words, the United States expected Russia to be too stretched to help Iran, hoping to force the Kremlin to decide whether to aid Iran (and therefore concede ground in Ukraine) or continue aiding Ukraine at the expense of failing to assist its ally (and therefore lose credibility and prestige). Not only that, but the US has had the advantage of witnessing Russian troops in action for over four years; Russian forces have expended significant resources in their war, and the Russian military, while honed by combat experience, is also marred by poor conditions, mistreatment and morale issues. Regarding China, the US expected its help to be discreet and mainly diplomatic. This does make sense in light of Russia and China contenting themselves with diplomatic responses and declarations when the US struck key Iranian targets in June 2025 and when the US carried out its operation in Venezuela. The United States therefore assumed inactivity from Russia and China. A success in Iran would have been a tremendous geopolitical boon to the US. It would have demonstrated its superiority compared to Russia’s ongoing struggle against Ukrainian opposition, proving that it could do far more easily in a matter of days (weeks?) what Russia failed to accomplish in over four years of ongoing warfare. It would have given it leverage over Iran’s oil and therefore over the global oil supply, creating additional pressure on rivals such as Russia. For China, Venezuela and Iran taken together account for 13% of China’s crude oil imports, right behind Russia and US-allied Saudi Arabia, so this would have given the US some leverage in its interactions with China (albeit, as mentioned above, China is not as reliant on Iran’s oil as one would believe). Speaking of which, several oil-rich Gulf states, several of which are US allies, have historically had tense relations with Iran owing both to ideological differences (Iran is a Shi’a theocracy whereas the others adhere mostly to Sunni Islam) and to competition as oil exporters. States such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in particular have had tense relations with Iran even before the 2026 war. Saudi Arabia and Iran, in particular, have been in a long-standing proxy war; they clashed following their involvement in the Yemeni Civil War, where Iran backed the (mostly Shi’a) Houthi rebels while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain backed the internationally recognized government.

In addition to military clashes, Iran and Saudi Arabia have also been engaged in an “oil war” of sorts. Iranian oil had resorted to being sold at a discount due to international sanctions. Moreover, China accounts for nearly 91% of Iran’s oil exports, owing primarily to these sanctions that left it isolated from other countries, paving the way for China to gain a foothold, which meant that it undercut other oil-rich states allied with the US (e.g. Saudi Arabia, the UAE), displaced them in China’s oil imports, and created a downward shift on the market. The US attacks therefore sought to weaken Iran’s military and, in particular, nuclear capabilities, as well as reduce Iran’s ability to finance terrorist activities in the Middle East, eliminate its backing for proxies elsewhere (e.g. Hezbollah, support for Houthi rebels), and gain leverage over Iran’s oil exports. It would also have been a major prestige victory over Russia and China, demonstrating that it can do what the latter two failed to do militarily in Ukraine and the South China Sea respectively. This would also have earned the US a major foothold and created a US-allied “pincer” on the Strait of Hormuz, a major geostrategic leverage tool. Nevertheless, the failure to accomplish any major objective in Iran would be an immense geopolitical failure. China benefits from preferential imports from Iran, from taxes for crossing the Strait of Hormuz being collected in its currency – the yuan – and can also focus on further ramping up its military presence in the South China Sea now that the US is focusing its attention on the Middle East. Russia benefits from increasing prices and lifted sanctions as the world is faced yet again with the reality of enduring reliance on oil and gas. Russia also slowly benefits from the economic pressure that European countries face as a result of an enduring crisis; while Russia can refund its military with this economic shot in the arm, European states weaken and find themselves increasingly torn between aiding Ukraine or focusing on domestic matters. The recent election of Péter Magyar in Hungary, leading to a regime change after sixteen years of FIDESZ governance under Viktor Orbán, was met with a collective sigh of relief from the EU as Hungary is now seen as resettling on a pro-European path.

However, the situation in other countries is not as clear. In France, for example, the current favourite for the 2027 presidential elections is Jordan Bardella, head of the nationalist party known as the National Rally (or RN, from fr. “Rassemblement National”), who recently voted against a €90 billion aid package to Ukraine in the European Parliament. In addition, in Germany, recent polls from YouGov and INSA show a steady presence of the far-right Alternative for Germany (or AfD, from germ. “Alternative für Deutschland”) gaining a steady lead over the Union between the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union (collectively known as the CDU/CSU), or at the very least going neck-and-neck with it. AfD has often been seen as being in close relations with Moscow, campaigning for maintaining friendly relations with China, with allegations that the party is actually being financed indirectly by the Kremlin. AfD has been on a steady upward trend for over a decade now, owing to several issues that have garnered discontent among segments of the population, such as aversion to immigration, the controversial multicultural model, poor handling of the refugee crisis, and, more recently, costly support for Ukraine in its defense against Russia. Therefore, the longer the United States and Iran remain in this deadlock, the more Russia benefits while Europe weakens. This prospect, combined with veiled threats from the Trump Administration that the US would not intervene in the case of a Russian attack on any European country, adds even more pressure on Europe, as in the long term it is Russia that benefits the most. So, for the EU, it is of the utmost importance for the war to finish as quickly as possible, not only due to economic security concerns, but also to prevent the rise of populism and nationalism and, externally, to prevent Ukraine from falling to Russia. The US, in turn, is now obligated to obtain something from its negotiations with Iran that will allow it to justify calling its operation a success. Iran is aware of the effects the war has on the United States’ allies and wants to turn the current military confrontation into a battle of wills, a war of attrition to slowly erode the United States’ incentive to fight, whereas the US needs either a military victory or a resounding success in negotiations, which it can only obtain via significant leverage, which it attempts to achieve by blockading the Strait of Hormuz, thereby starving both Iran’s partners and Iran itself.

To better understand the United States’ operations in Venezuela and Iran, it is worth taking a look at the wider context, as they fit a pattern the current administration has embarked upon in order to transform the United States’ role on the proverbial geopolitical chessboard, and that much is written in its very National Security Strategy of 2025.

Photo source: PxHere.com.

(To be continued)